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FAILED BOUNDARIES: THE NEAR-PERFECT 
CORRELATION BETWEEN STATE-TO-STATE WTO CLAIMS 
AND PRIVATE PARTY INVESTMENT RIGHTS 
Ari Afilalo∗ 
ABSTRACT 
This project is the first empirical examination of WTO filings to determine if 
a private party could bring an action for damages arising under the same core 
of operative facts pursuant to a bilateral investment treaty. This Article reviews 
all national treatment, most favored nation, quantitative restrictions, TBT, and 
SPS filings. After exploring the doctrinal and theoretical reasons for the 
trade/investment tension, it analyzes those trade filings under a model 
investment treaty applied in light of decided cases. This Article classifies the 
filings into “Positive,” “Potentially Positive,” and “Negative” categories. The 
findings show a near perfect correlation between trade and investment. These 
findings are highly significant not only because this is the first empirical study 
of its kind, but also because they suggest that private parties that relied on 
liberalized trade laws to invest across borders would have private causes of 
action for damages for protectionist measures that violate international 
economic law. Trade has traditionally been the domain of state-to-state dispute 
resolution, where states often operate based on rational choice, selective 
determinations of which matters to prosecute. Shifting trade litigation to the 
private party cause of action model would fundamentally alter sovereign 
immunity and the balance of power between private parties—in particular, large 
multinational corporations—and host jurisdictions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In this Article, I report the outcome of my study of the cases filed by 
governments with the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) during the WTO’s first 20 years of operation in the most 
controversial areas of trade law,1 with a view to determine whether a private 
party could bring a complaint before an investment arbitral tribunal that arises 
from the same core operative facts as under trade law. My goal was to test if, in 
fact, as I had argued before,2 the network of investment treaties regulating the 
cross-border flow of capital overlaps with trade law. The answer is an 
unqualified yes. 
Trade filings are the domain of the WTO,3 which acts at the request of the 
contracting parties’ governments and issues rulings invalidating national laws 
found to violate the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).4 The 
WTO hears a wide range of cases.5 It deals with controversies involving plainly 
protectionist measures such as import bans or domestic taxes.6 It also decides 
whether sensitive domestic laws that hinder trade pass muster under 
international economic law,7 such as restrictions on the use of asbestos,8 
hormones,9 or genetically modified materials;10 packaging laws regulating the 
 
 1  See infra notes 17–21. 
 2 See, e.g., Ari Afilalo, Meaning, Ambiguity, and Legitimacy, Judicial (Re-)Construction of NAFTA 
Chapter 11, 25 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 279, 281–82 (2005). 
 3 Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/ 
thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2018). 
 4 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, art. 3.8, Apr. 15, 1994, 
1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 403 [hereinafter DSU]; General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XXIII(2), Oct. 30, 
1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, 268 [hereinafter GATT]. 
 5 See, e.g., Raj Bhala et al., WTO Case Review 2016, 34 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 281, 281–84 (2017). 
 6 Ari Afilalo & Sheila Foster, The World Trade Organization’s Anti-Discrimination Jurisprudence: Free 
Trade, National Sovereignty, and Environmental Health in the Balance, 15 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 633, 
650–59 (2003).  
 7 See, e.g., Panel Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-
Containing Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS135/R (adopted Sept. 18, 2000).  
 8 Laurie Kazan-Allen, The International Dimension of Asbestos in the 21st Century, in ALI-ABA 
COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS 1, 3 (2001). 
 9  See Suzanne Bermann, EC-Hormones and the Case for an Express WTO Post-Retaliation Procedure, 
107 COLUM. L. REV. 131, 138 (2007). 
 10 Daniel Schramm, The Race to Geneva: Resisting the Gravitational Pull of the WTO in the GMO 
Labeling Controversy, 9 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 93, 96 (2007). 
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advertising and marketing of cigarettes;11 or measures intended to preserve 
foreign currency reserves in a financial crisis.12  
Investment law is the domain of arbitral tribunals13 awarding damages to 
private parties, rather than states, when their legitimate expectations are thwarted 
by government measures adopted by the host jurisdiction.14 The investment legal 
regime also handles a wide array of cases, including revoked permits; breached 
agreements; modifications to advance official rulings incorporating agreements 
concerning the treatment of foreign investors on tax, securities regulation, and 
other matters; the expropriation of property; denial of justice; administrative 
irregularities; and a plethora of disputes between investors and their host states.15 
The state-to-state WTO system and the investor-to-state investment 
framework arose from different historical circumstances and are typically 
categorized as different subject-matter areas of international law governed by 
constitutional and institutional norms that sharply differ.16 Yet my analysis of 
the WTO filings shows that private parties may use investment treaties to litigate 
virtually all trade causes of action and obtain damages for any violation of trade 
law. In this Article, I reviewed approximately 180 filings during the first two 
decades of operation of the WTO that were made under the national treatment,17 
most favored nation,18 and quantitative restrictions provisions of the GATT;19 
the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT);20 and the Agreement on 
 
 11 Suzy Frankel & Daniel Gervais, Plain Packaging and the Interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement, 46 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1149, 1151 (2013). 
 12  Robert W. Staiger, “Currency Manipulation” and World Trade, 9 WORLD TRADE REV. 583, 606–07 
(2010). 
 13 What is Investment Arbitration?, INT’L ARB. L., http://internationalarbitrationlaw.com/about-
arbitration/international-disputes/investment-arbitration/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2018). 
 14 Id. 
 15 See, e.g., Ari Afilalo, Constitutionalization Through the Back Door: A European Perspective on 
NAFTA’s Investment Chapter, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 3 (2001); Bryan W. Blades, The Exhausting 
Question of Local Remedies: Expropriation Under NAFTA Chapter 11, 8 OR. REV. INT’L L. 31, 64 (2006); 
Ernest A. Young, Institutional Settlement in a Globalizing System, 54 DUKE L.J. 1143, 1164 (2005). 
 16 Afilalo, supra note 15, at 9–31. 
 17 GATT, supra note 4, at 204 (barring measures giving less favorable treatment to foreign products 
compared to domestic products). 
 18 Id. at 196, 198 (barring taxation measures giving less favorable treatment to products of one country 
over another country). 
 19 Id. at 218, 220 (barring restrictions limiting the volume or value of goods imported into the country). 
 20 The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) was adopted as an ancillary to the GATT 
Agreement to “ensure that technical regulations and standards, including packaging, marking and labelling 
requirements, and procedures for assessment of conformity with technical regulations and standards do not create 
unnecessary obstacles to international trade.” See Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade pmbl. art. 2.2, Apr. 
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1868 U.NT.S. 120, 
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/17-tbt.pdf [hereinafter TBT Agreement]. 
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the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS).21 These cases 
are grouped in this Article because they implicate similar issues of trade and 
investment law and they cover most controversies dealing with the three 
“pillars” of trade. 
My findings leave little room to doubt that the investment framework 
overlaps with the trade framework. I classified the trade cases into two 
categories: Trade Positive and Trade Negative. Trade Positives are cases that 
have either been decided in favor of the complainant by the DSB or did not reach 
the adjudicatory stage but would have a substantial likelihood of success by the 
complainant—applying trade law to the facts as stated in the filings. Cases where 
the respondent prevailed or is reasonably likely to prevail belong in the Trade 
Negative category. I then classified the Trade Positives and Trade Negatives into 
three investment categories: Investment Positive, Potentially Positive, and 
Negative. These categories are based on whether a private party would likely 
prevail in an investment cause of action arising out of the same facts, would have 
a colorable chance of prevailing, or would likely lose. 
The examination of the respective trade and investment outcomes shows a 
near-perfect correlation between Trade Positives, and Investment Positives or 
Potentially Positives. Approximately two-thirds of the Trade Positives have 
Investment Positive outcomes, and one-third of the Trade Positives have 
Potentially Positive investment outcomes. There are no cases where, applying 
investment law, a Trade Positive can be said with reasonable certainty to be an 
Investment Negative. Furthermore, some losing complainants in trade could, in 
an action brought by their private party nationals, raise the same issue in an 
investment cause of action with a Potentially Positive outcome. (The case-by-
case results are reported in tables appearing with each grouping of WTO cases 
in Part III.) 
These findings demonstrate that states that introduce policies inconsistent 
with their obligations under the GATT expose themselves to possible investment 
arbitration claims. Private parties and their attorneys could acquire a legal 
weapon to challenge virtually every measure that may violate free trade and 
obtain money damages for those breaches. States might escape liability for 
 
 21  As stated in the Recitals of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
(SPS), it was adopted to “elaborate rules for the application of the provisions of GATT 1994 which relate to the 
use of sanitary or phytosanitary measures, in particular the provisions of Article XX(b).” See Agreement on the 
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures art. 5.1–5.2, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 493, https://www.wto.org/English/ 
docs_e/legal_e/15-sps.pdf [hereinafter SPS Agreement]. 
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breaches of the GATT in the WTO dispute system because states—on account 
of having limited legal resources and fear of retaliation for their own 
violations—are likely to bring legal challenges only in disputes involving high 
monetary, political, or precedential stakes.22 However, in the overlapping 
investment arbitration system, states will have virtually unlimited exposure to 
lawsuits brought by private parties arising from the very same measure and core 
operative facts.23 
In Part I, I describe the history of trade and investment and how two systems 
intended to operate in different realms of international economic law came to 
overlap. In Part II, I explore the doctrinal reasons for the trade/investment 
tension, using decided investment cases, standard investment treaty provisions, 
and familiar principles of trade law. In Part III, after explaining my methodology 
for grouping trade cases and predicting outcomes, I review the filings discussed 
in this Article. I conclude with some observations and a preview of the next steps 
in this research project. 
I. TRADE AND INVESTMENT 
In Part I, I outline the historical, institutional, and constitutional features of 
the trade and investment systems that are relevant to their intersection.  
A. Trade 
Trade is the domain of the WTO and regional frameworks such as the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).24 Their membership includes states 
that established a relatively transparent system to monitor international 
interference with their internal regulatory power.25 Those states decided to 
 
 22 Geoffrey Garrett & James McCall Smith, The Politics of WTO Dispute Settlement 1, 3–4 (UCLA Int’l 
Inst. Occasional Paper Series, 2002), https://escholarship.org/uc/item/4t4952d7; see also infra note 27 and 
accompanying text. 
 23 See Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez & William W. Park, The New Face of Investment Arbitration: NAFTA 
Chapter 11, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 365, 371 (2003). 
 24 North American Free Trade Agreement arts. 1116, 1117, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) 
[hereinafter NAFTA]. 
 25 In particular, many scholars emphasized the benefits of the open and transparent system of the 
Appellate Body’s interpretative methods, which have given clear guidance to Members of the WTO and to 
panels. It has thus contributed to “providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system.” DSU, 
supra note 4, art. 3.2. See ISABELLE VAN DAMME, TREATY INTERPRETATION BY THE WTO APPELLATE BODY 
614 (Oxford Univ. Press 2009); see also Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Experiences from the WTO Appellate Body, 
38 TEXAS INT’L L.J. 469, 469 (2003). However, please note that, on the other hand, particularly as a result of the 
lack of more formal participatory rights for NGOs, the WTO was sometimes accused of “being one of the least 
transparent international organizations . . . .” See, e.g., U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 
2002: DEEPENING DEMOCRACY IN A FRAGMENTED WORLD 120–21 (2002). 
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handle disputes without involving private parties or giving direct effect to trade 
law.26 With few exceptions, only governments have the right to take 
enforcement action, and individuals do not have standing to sue.27 Government 
officials carefully select which disputes sufficiently implicate weighty national 
interests before bringing them to dispute resolution.28 In doing so, they weigh 
limited resources and the possibility of retaliation for their own violation before 
initiating legal proceedings. States will exercise their prudential choice in the 
marketplace of violations to determine which disputes to prosecute and which 
violations to refrain from challenging (or to let stand after an initial filing), in 
exchange for the other side giving up a claim of its own.29 Likewise, “networks” 
of government officials forge bonds across borders to create a loose but effective 
network of lawmakers and enforcers.30 
The limited liability of the state enshrined in trade law is consistent with the 
origins and theoretical foundations of the GATT and the WTO. The original 
GATT carefully maintained a structure that protected state sovereignty and 
regulatory space.31 As John Maynard Keynes famously expressed, the lawyers 
as “poets of Bretton Woods” married after World War II a good economic idea 
 
 26 Helene Ruiz Fabri, Is There a Case – Legally and Politically – for Direct Effect of WTO Obligations?, 
25 EUR. J. INT’L L. 151, 154 (2014). 
 27 NAFTA, in addition to its Investment Chapter, gives individuals some access to its dispute resolution 
systems. The Side Agreement on Labor, for instance, includes a procedure pursuant to which private party 
complaints may be filed and trigger investigations, public hearings, non-binding recommendations, and other 
measures. If the parties fail to resolve the dispute between themselves, and if the dispute relates to certain labor 
rights (e.g., occupational health and safety), then an arbitration panel will have the power to prepare a report. If 
it finds that a party “persistently failed” to enforce its laws, the disputing parties will prepare an action plan, and 
if the parties do not agree or if the plan is not fully implemented, the panel can be reconvened. If the panel finds 
that the plan was not implemented, the offending party can be fined. If the fine is not paid, NAFTA trade benefits 
can be suspended to pay the fine. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation arts. 27–29, 39(1), 41(2), 
Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1499 (1993). 
 28 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Why Rational Choice Theory Requires a Multilevel Constitutional Approach 
to International Economic Law – A Response to the Case Against Reforming the WTO’s Enforcement 
Mechanism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 359, 366 (2008). 
 29 JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Oxford Univ. Press 
2005); see also Robert Z. Lawrence, The United States and WTO Dispute Settlement System, in COUNCIL ON 
FOREIGN RELATIONS, COUNCIL SPECIAL REPORTS NO. 25 at 1, 10–11 (Mar. 2007); Petersmann, supra note 28. 
 30 Anne-Marie Slaughter frequently discussed the efficiencies provided by government networks, 
particularly the regulatory network. She described governance through a complex global web of “government 
networks” whereby government officials (legislators, police investigators, judges, financial regulators, etc.) 
exchange information and coordinate activity across national borders to solve problems resulting from the daily 
grind of international interactions. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, Government Networks: The Heart of the 
Liberal Democratic Order, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 200, 214, 217, 223–24 
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2000). 
 31 See GATT, supra note 4, at 262, 264. 
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with a politically acceptable treaty system.32 The GATT established three 
“pillars” of trade: tariff reduction and most favored nation,33 national 
treatment,34 and prohibition of quotas and like measures. Those regimes were 
designed to open borders without dictating national policy.35 The architecture of 
the GATT insulated national taxation and regulation from potential infringement 
by international norms.36 Its constitutional architecture was designed to leave 
redistributive justice to the sovereign jurisdiction of the national political 
actors.37 
John Ruggie captured this bargain with his “embedded liberalism” 
shorthand.38 The nations that emerged as victors from World War II featured 
highly evolved administrative states and regulatory systems spanning a wide 
array of economic and social issues.39 The amorphous concept of sovereignty, 
in that context, captured the ability of the state to legislate at the level of its 
choosing—free of constraints from conflicting norms of international law.40 The 
GATT system’s adoption of the core pillars that liberalized trade without 
infringing on domestic policy made it palatable for modern liberal democracies 
to accept the treaty. 
The state-to-state system of dispute resolution added another prophylactic 
layer of sovereignty to the normative protections that was indispensable to the 
contracting parties. States have limited legal resources and tend to behave 
reactively in controversies that implicate national interests of sufficient political 
or economic magnitude.41 They may negotiate and resolve prudentially the 
 
 32 Robert Howse, From Politics to Technocracy - and Back Again: The Fate of the Multilateral Trading 
Regime, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 95, 95–96 (2002). 
 33 GATT, supra note 4, at 196, 198. 
 34 Id. at 204.  
 35 Id. at 226. 
 36 Id. at 262. 
 37 DENNIS PATTERSON & ARI AFILALO, THE NEW GLOBAL TRADING ORDER: THE EVOLVING STATE AND 
THE FUTURE OF TRADE 70 (2008). 
 38 See John Gerard Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in 
the Post War Economic Order, 36 INT’L ORG. 379, 385–88 (1982). According to Professor John Gerard Ruggie, 
the GATT advanced “embedded liberalism” in each state, providing each participant, at least in theory, with the 
sovereign right to establish and operate a domestic system of its choice, and at the same time removed barriers 
to trade and created a more efficient trading system. Id. Each nation can maintain its identity and specific 
domestic programs ranging from universal education to the supply of subsidized metro tickets for large families, 
all the while participating in a liberalized system of trade that generates more global resources to share. Id. 
 39 See, e.g., Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, Administrative War, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1343, 1347–48 
(2014). 
 40 See, e.g., Panel Report, European Communities–Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing 
Products, § 3.19, WTO Doc. WT/DS135 (adopted Sept. 18, 2000) [hereinafter 2000 European Communities-
Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products Panel Report]. 
 41 See Garrett & Smith, supra note 22, at 10. 
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mutual violations that exist at any given time.42 In addition to these built-in 
limitations inherent in a state-to-state system, until the 1994 establishment of the 
WTO, the panel reports were not even adopted until all contracting parties, 
including the losing party in the dispute, gave their consent (called the “positive 
consensus rule” of the initial GATT of 1947).43 Even though the WTO reversed 
this rule,44 losing a case does not entail a cataclysmic legal event for the 
offending country. The GATT and later the WTO give the losing state a 
reasonable amount of time to change its internal laws to comply with the 
ruling.45 Although compensation and retaliation are technically available, the 
theoretical and practical preference is for voluntary compliance.46 
 
 42 See id. at 8–12.  
 43 See Julio Lacarte-Muró & Fernando Piérola Castro, Comparing the WTO and GATT Dispute Settlement 
Mechanisms: What Was Accomplished in the Uruguay Round?, in INTER-GOVERNMENTAL TRADE DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT: MULTILATERAL AND REGIONAL APPROACHES 33, 51 (Julio Lacarte-Muró & Jaime Granados eds., 
2004). 
 44 WTO Members changed the rule from positive consensus to negative consensus, whereby panel reports 
are adopted automatically unless there is a consensus to the contrary; this rule also applies to the adoption of 
Appellate Body reports, the establishment of panels, and the authorization to suspend concessions and other 
obligations. See DSU, supra note 4, art. 16.4. See generally 6.4 Adoption of Panel Reports, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c6s4p1_e.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2018). 
 45 See Timothy Webster, How China Implements WTO Decisions, 35 MICH. J. INT’L L. 525, 555 n.155 
(2014) (“For example, the U.S. has chosen not to repeal Section 211 of the Omnibus Appropriations Act, which 
the DSB determined violated the national treatment obligation of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights [TRIPS] Agreement in 2001. The United States told the DSB that it had ‘been 
working for more than ten years on the implementation of the DSB’s recommendations in this dispute,’ but has 
not amended the law. Countries—including China—have routinely urged the United States to comply with the 
ruling . . . .”) (citing World Trade Org. Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting 22–33, WT/DSB/M/316 
(July 20, 2012)). 
 46 The first objective of the contracting parties was traditionally “to secure the withdrawal of the measures 
concerned if these are found to be inconsistent with the General Agreement.” See Understanding Regarding 
Notification Consultation Dispute Settlement and Surveillance, GATT Doc. L/4907 (adopted Nov. 28, 1979), 
B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) [hereinafter 1979 Understanding]. The GATT also recognized that it may take time to 
make the necessary changes to domestic law in implementing the recommendations. Id. Therefore, “[i]f it is 
impracticable to comply immediately with the recommendations or rulings, the contracting party concerned shall 
have a reasonable period of time in which to do so.” Improvements to the GATT Dispute Settlement Rules and 
Procedures, ¶ I.2, L/6489, Apr. 12, 1989, GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) (1990). Although the withdrawal of 
inconsistent measures is the prevailing remedy for a breach of the GATT, according to Article 22 of 
“Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,” if a defending Member fails 
to comply with the WTO decision within the established compliance period, the aggrieved party is entitled to 
request temporary compensation or retaliation (i.e., to suspend concessions or obligations owed the non-
complying Member under a WTO agreement). GATT, supra note 4. However, it should be emphasized that 
according to Article 22, “neither compensation nor retaliation is preferred to full implementation of a 
recommendation to bring a measure into conformity with the covered agreements.” Id. According to Article 22, 
“compensation is voluntary and, if granted, shall be consistent with the covered agreements.” Id. Compensation 
is also referenced in the Reports Relating to the Review of the Agreement on Organization and Functional 
Questions and the Annex to the 1979 Understanding. Reports Relating to the Review of the Agreement on 
Organization and Functional Questions, ¶ 64, L/327, Feb. 28, Mar. 5, 7, 1955, GATT B.I.S.D. (3rd Supp.) 
(1955); 1979 Understanding, supra, annex. With respect to retaliation, under GATT practice, the contracting 
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Of course, as anyone who watched demonstrations calling for “fair trade” 
must have guessed, the normative framework sheltering sovereign regulation 
still leaves significant areas of pressure against national law.47 It has been widely 
recognized that domestic concerns routinely burden trade, and international 
trade tribunals define the boundaries of the domestic regulatory space upon 
which international law may not infringe.48 By way of example, Indonesia filed 
a complaint against the United States to challenge the U.S. ban on clove 
cigarettes, requiring the WTO to determine whether the U.S. measure should be 
upheld as furthering a valid public health goal or invalidated as a protectionist 
scheme to favor domestic menthol cigarettes in competition with clove.49 
Argentina had to defend before investment arbitration panels measures designed 
to shift to its trading partners costs associated with shoring up domestic currency 
reserves, an essential domestic policy goal in a country beset by financial 
crises.50 The WTO had to determine whether EU bans on asbestos and hormones 
furthered a valid domestic policy regarding health and occupational safety or 
 
parties may only be authorized by the DSB to retaliate when a violating party does not comply with a panel 
recommendation within a reasonable period of time, and retaliation most often involves the suspension of GATT 
tariff concessions. GATT, supra note 4. There was only one instance where retaliation was authorized under 
GATT. KIL WON LEE, IMPROVING REMEDIES IN THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 17 (Proquest, Umi 
Dissertation Publ’g 2011) (“In Netherlands Measures of Suspension, the U.S. did not remove its import 
restrictions, which were found to be inconsistent to the General Agreement. In response, the Contracting Parties 
authorized the Netherlands to ‘suspend the application to the United States of their obligation under the General 
Agreement to the extent necessary to allow the Netherlands Government to impose an upper limit of 60,000 
metric tons on imports of wheat flour from the United States during the calendar year 1953.’ However, the 
Netherlands did not retaliate against the US. After a number of years, a compromise was apparently reached as 
the US relaxed its quotas on Edam and Gouda cheese and the Netherlands no longer requested the extension of 
its authority to retaliate.”). See generally Asim Imdad Ali, Non-Compliance and Ultimate Remedies Under the 
WTO Dispute Settlement System, 14 J. PUB. & INT’L AFF. 5 (2003). 
 47 Fair trade is a shorthand expression to capture goods that have been produced in accordance with 
principles of respect for labor rights, the environment, and other considerations. See generally Paulette L. 
Stanzer, The Pursuit of Equilibrium as the Eagle Meets the Condor: Supporting Sustainable Development 
Through Fair Trade, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 557, 557 (2012) (“Fair Trade is a label for a movement, a process, and a 
set of principles. Fair Trade goods can be identified in one of two ways: (1) specific goods have been certified 
by a Fair Trade organization or (2) goods that are sold by a seller who is a member of a Fair Trade organization 
recognized by the Fair Trade community.”). 
 48 See Ari Afilalo, Rotating Checks and Balances in International Economic Law, in HANDBOOK OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRADE 414, 418 (David Deese ed., 2014); see, e.g., Claude E. Barfield, 
Free Trade, Sovereignty, Democracy: The Future of the World Trade Organization, 2 CH. J. INT’L L. 403, 412 
(2001); Markus Wagner, Regulatory Space in International Trade Law and International Investment Law, 36 
U. Pᴀ. J. Iɴᴛ’ʟ L. 1, 1 (2014).  
 49 Afilalo, supra note 48; see, e.g., Lucas Ballet, Losing Flavor: Indonesia’s WTO Complaint Against the 
U.S. Ban on Clove Cigarettes, 26 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 515, 516–18 (2011). 
 50 Afilalo, supra note 48; see Robert M. Ziff, The Sovereign Debtors Prison: Analysis of the Argentine 
Crisis Arbitrations and the Implications for Investment Treaty Law, 10 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 345, 362 
(2011). 
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amounted to an illegal protection of a competitive domestic product.51 “The 
great questions of trade have often hinged on the judgment call of a tribunal in 
favor of the domestic regulatory space or, alternatively, on the side of the free 
movement of goods.”52 The trade system is creating obstacles to challenges to 
sovereignty because when trade encroaches on the sovereign right to regulate, it 
should act within the confines of a system that has legitimacy.53 
Moreover, “the WTO has gradually supplemented the core GATT pillars 
with agreements that go beyond the negative injunctions and discriminatory 
rationale of the treaty.”54 The SPS, for example, requires that states engage in a 
risk assessment and rely on credible scientific evidence before adopting sanitary 
measures, such as rules banning apples that may suffer from fire blight or beef 
with hormones.55 The TBT encourages the Contracting Parties to regulate based 
on international standards, bans the maintenance of measures that are no longer 
necessary to achieve their objectives, and provides that technical measures may 
not hinder trade more than necessary to achieve the underlying objective.56 The 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (TRIPS) 
requires the Contracting Parties to conform their levels of intellectual protection 
to the international minimum mandate.57 Going beyond discrimination and 
protectionism as the rationale for invalidating a national measure creates a 
 
 51 Afilalo, supra note 48; see also Afilalo & Foster, supra note 6, at 658; Bhala et al., supra note 5, at 
362 n.157, 441. 
 52 Afilalo, supra note 48. 
 53 This system resembled the classic international organizations of the time such as the United Nations 
and the European Union, whose basic laws were premised on the inviolability of the participating states’ rights 
to be free from interference by others. See, e.g., Ari Afilalo & Dennis Patterson, Statecraft and the Foundations 
of European Union Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN UNION LAW 275, 287 (Julie Dickson 
& Pavlos Eleftheriadis eds., 2012) (describing how European Treaties, for example, although “more ambitious 
than any international treaty in force at the time, still provided a substantial level of protection of the Member 
States’ ability to legislate.”). “Each Member State could, to a certain extent, remain a “black box” in which it 
enjoyed freedom to determine how best to support the welfare of its nations, free from interference by European 
law.” Id. 
 54 Afilalo, supra note 48, at 419. 
 55 See SPS Agreement, supra note 21, arts. 5.1–5.2. 
 56 See TBT Agreement, supra note 20, art. 2.2. 
 57 See TRIPS: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 
U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. “The TRIPS Agreement is arguably one of the most controversial 
of the Uruguay Round Agreements and has been the subject of numerous articles and commentaries.” Uche 
Ewelukwa, Patent Wars in the Valley of the Shadow of Death: The Pharmaceutical Industry, Ethics, and Global 
Trade, 59 U. MIAMI L. REV. 203, 204 n.4 (2005) (citing ROBERT L. OSTERGARD, JR., THE DEVELOPMENT 
DILEMMA: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 110 
(2003)); Haochen Sun, A Wider Access to Patented Drugs Under the TRIPS Agreement, 21 B.U. INT’L L.J. 101, 
102 (2003)). 
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potentially higher level of pressure on state sovereignty.58 The international 
trade regime has often been under attack because of the pressure it imposes on 
state sovereignty.59  
B. Investment 
Investment treaties embody a different rationale and arose from a different 
history than trade law.60 At their core, they aim to give private investors a direct 
cause of action against the central government of the host state.61 The very same 
modern liberal democracies, led by the United States, for whom sheltering 
sovereignty in the trade context had been so important, insisted that their 
investors should have the right to bring a claim against the states wherever they 
do business.62 They rejected domestic courts as the venue for investor claims as 
unreliably biased and demanded an international neutral arbitral forum instead.63 
They sought to hold the central governments of the host states responsible for 
violations committed by any branch of government, whether executive, 
legislative, or judicial, and whether central, regional, or local.64 These tribunals, 
the West insisted, should have the power to award damages to make aggrieved 
investors whole and compensate them for treaty violations, with awards being 
enforceable in domestic courts under normal principles of arbitration law.65 
This stance was, originally, squarely aimed at protecting investments in 
emerging economies.66 The international conversation about investment 
protection started after decolonization and quickly became a focal point of the 
ideological dispute between industrialized and less-developed nations.67 It first 
took place in the context of the Western (or “Northern,” as industrialized states 
were often labeled) push for a multilateral investment treaty that would write 
 
 58 Ari Afilalo, Failed Boundaries: The Near-Perfect Correlation Between State-to-State WTO Claims 
and Private Party Investment Rights 11 (Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 01, 2013). 
 59 Id.; Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.–Oct. 1997, 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1997-09-01/real-new-world-order. 
 60 Afilalo, supra note 58; Lauge N. Skovgaard Poulsen, Sacrificing Sovereignty by Chance:  
Investment Treaties, Developing Countries, and Bounded Rationality (June 2011) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, 
London School of Economics and Political Science), http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/141/1/Poulsen_Sacrificing_ 
sovereignty_by_chance.pdf. 
 61 Afilalo, supra note 15, at 4; Afilalo, supra note 58. 
 62 Afilalo, supra note 15, at 4–5; Afilalo, supra note 58. 
 63 Afilalo, supra note 15 at 17; Afilalo, supra note 58. 
 64 Afilalo, supra note 15, at 4; Afilalo, supra note 58, at 11–12. 
 65 Afilalo, supra note 15, at 31; Afilalo, supra note 58, at 12. 
 66 Afilalo, supra note 15, at 18; Gloria L. Sandrino, The NAFTA Investment Chapter and Foreign Direct 
Investment in Mexico: A Third World Perspective, 29 VAN. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 259, 261–62 (1994).  
 67 Afilalo, supra note 58, at 12. 
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into international law their substantive and institutional needs.68 Capital-
exporting countries worried about the economic interests they left behind when 
their former colonies achieved political self-determination.69 They wanted the 
framework investment treaty to include a clear requirement that the newly 
independent governments would not expropriate private property unless the 
government paid compensation at fair market value.70  
The capital-exporting countries also wanted protection against 
discriminatory treatment.71 The countries of the South sought to impose 
“performance requirements” on foreign investors to shore up the domestic 
economy, such as domestic content, capital, or intellectual property transfers; 
mandatory partnerships with local businesses; and other measures intended to 
give the hosts greater and longer-term benefits than those obtained in the normal 
course of business.72 In addition, the North demanded that the broad body of 
customary international law guaranteeing minimum standards of protection73 be 
applied and guaranteed by the international arbitration tribunals.74 
For the South, these demands amounted to yet another manifestation of 
colonial arrogance.75 The political self-determination that the former colonies 
had earned would not be complete without economic self-determination, and the 
framework advocated by their erstwhile colonizers would make this goal 
unattainable.76 Property acquired by their former colonizers’ economic agents 
and left behind by their political echelons should be nationalized as necessary. 
The expropriation of the foreign economic interests would not, under the South’s 
view, necessitate a payment of full market value by the nationalizing 
government—rather, that the nationalizing state would only be required to pay 
 
 68 Afilalo, supra note 15, at 18; Afilalo, supra note 58, at 12; see also PETER J. BURNELL, ECONOMIC 
NATIONALISM IN THE THIRD WORLD 243–44 (Westview Press 1996); Sandrino, supra note 66, at 259 (reviewing 
Mexico’s historic leadership role in the South and its subsequent acceptance of the positions espoused by the 
more developed countries with the adoption of NAFTA). 
 69 Afilalo, supra note 15, at 14; Afilalo, supra note 58, at 12. 
 70 Afilalo, supra note 58, at 12; see Oscar Schachter, Compensation for Expropriation, 78 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 121, 126 (1984). 
 71 Andrea Saldarriaga & Kendra Magraw, UNCTAD’s Effort to Foster the Relationship Between 
International Investment Law and Sustainable Development, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND 
DEVELOPMENT: BRIDGING THE GAP 125, 131 (Stephan W. Schill, Christian J. Tams & Rainer Hofmann eds., 
2015). 
 72 Afilalo, supra note 58, at 12; see BURNELL, supra note 68. 
 73 Afilalo, supra note 58, at 12; see Charles N. Brower & John Tepe, The Charter of Economic Rights 
and Duties of States: A Reflection or Rejection of International Law, 9 INT’L LAW. 295, 302 (1975). 
 74 Afilalo, supra note 58 at 12; see, e.g., David E. Graham, The Calvo Clause: Its Current Status as a 
Contractual Renunciation of Diplomatic Protection, 6 TEX. INT’L F. 289, 304 (1971). 
 75 Afilalo, supra note 58, at 12. 
 76 Afilalo, supra note 15, at 17–18; Afilalo, supra note 58, at 12.  
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whatever is “adequate in the circumstances” (i.e., not much in a post-
colonization context).77 The host countries should have the right to protect 
themselves against the risk of “dependent development” by imposing 
performance requirements and making sure that foreign capital infusion 
generates the opportunity to sustain long-term, meaningful development.78 
Minimum standards of protection should be rejected because the customary 
international law that defined them had, for the most part, been developed during 
an era when the colonizers subjugated the newly formed states of the South.79  
The parties also feuded as to the proper venue for bringing claims. The West 
demanded neutral, supra-national courts, whereas the “Calvo Doctrine” 
categorically rejected the grant of jurisdiction to international tribunals.80 Under 
that doctrine, domestic courts of the newly independent countries would apply, 
as they saw fit, domestic standards adopted independently of the colonizer and 
its yoke.81 This, too, was an indispensable element of the self-determination 
package.82 In 1977, the United Nations adopted the “Charter of the Economic 
Rights and Duties of States,” with Southern and non-aligned votes approving the 
Charter over the objection of the industrialized states of the North.83 This 
effectively ended the Northern hope for a multilateral investment treaty, and 
such an international agreement was never reached between the North and the 
South.84  
And yet, the North ultimately prevailed.85 The victory of the North did not 
come with a formal capitulation or dramatic watershed event such as the 
 
 77 Afilalo, supra note 58, at 12; see, e.g., Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A Brief History of International 
Investment Agreements, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 157, 168 (2005). 
 78 Afilalo, supra note 58, at 12–13. See generally Theotonio Dos Santos, The Structure of Dependence, 
60 AM. ECON. REV. 231, 235–36 (1970). 
 79 Afilalo, supra note 58, at 13; Vandevelde, supra note 77, at 159–60. 
 80 Afilalo, supra note 58, at 13; Bernardo M. Cremades, Disputes Arising Out of Foreign Direct 
Investment in Latin America: A New Look at the Calvo Doctrine and Other Jurisdictional Issues, 59 JUL DISP. 
RESOL. J. 78, 80 (2004); see also Alexia Brunet & Juan Agustin Lentini, Arbitration of International Oil, Gas 
& Energy Disputes in Latin America, 27 N. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 591, 592 (2007). 
 81 Afilalo, supra note 58, at 13. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id.; see Burns H. Weston, The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States and the Deprivation 
of Foreign Owned Wealth, 75 AM. J. INT’L L. 437, 437 (1981). 
 84  Afilalo, supra note 58, at 13. Attempts to create multilateral investment agreements can be traced back 
to the end of the 1950s. RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
LAW 18 (2008). Among these attempts are the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s 
(OECD) draft that was not accepted by non-member countries and the attempt to achieve a multilateral 
investment agreement as part of the unsuccessful negotiations over the proposed International Trade 
Organization (ITO). See, e.g., id., at 18; ANDREW PAUL NEWCOMBE & LLUÍS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE 
OF INVESTMENT TREATIES: STANDARDS OF TREATMENT 19–22 (2009). 
 85 Afilalo, supra note 58, at 13. 
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adoption of a multilateral treaty or an international conference.86 Instead, it came 
quietly and gradually.87 Starting in the 1990s, the South stopped being the old 
South and began its transformation into a powerful bloc of emerging markets.88 
The financial world coalesced into intertwined markets competing for capital. 
Private investors and their foreign direct investment became a sought-after 
source of funds and, with technological advances, they acquired access to instant 
and plentiful information regarding the host jurisdiction.89 “BRICS” countries 
emerged,90 fueled by export manufacturing.91 A symbiotic relationship of 
interdependence (export countries reinvest the profits made in the import 
countries into the economies of such import markets, thereby stimulating more 
demand) became a mainstay of international commerce.92 In this new global 
culture, bilateral investment treaties proliferated with cross-border investment. 
This resulted in the commercial and financial worlds becoming regulated by 
thousands of investment treaties entered into bilaterally, trilaterally, or within 
the framework of regional agreements such as Chapter 11 of NAFTA.93 
The issues of the day from the post-decolonization time became much less 
sensitive.94 Regardless of whether the “signal value”95 of investment treaties was 
a necessary prerequisite and condition for foreign capital to flow into a host 
nation, the countries that previously were so attached to rejecting the multilateral 
investment framework advocated by the West suddenly seemed to care a lot 
less.96 Mexico’s story is a perfect example of this phenomenon.97 After spending 
decades as the flag-bearer of the South in the investment dispute, Mexico signed 
on in the early 1990s to the Investment Chapter of NAFTA, which is the poster 
 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. 
 90 BRIC was a term coined in 2001 by James O’Neill, an economist and former Goldman & Sachs analyst, 
which became a shorthand for the alliances of Brazil, Russia, India, and China on various issues. Tamara Fisher, 
China and the New Development Bank: The Future of Foreign Aid?, 38 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 141, 
141 (2016). This group now includes South Africa. See id. 
 91 Afilalo, supra note 58, at 13. 
 92 Id. at 14; see Afilalo, supra note 15, at 17–19. 
 93 Afilalo, supra note 58, at 14. 
 94 Id. 
 95 See Jeswal W. Salacuse, Of Handcuffs and Signals: Investment Treaties and Capital Flows to 
Developing Countries, 58 HARV. INT’L L.J. 127, 164 (2017) (arguing that investment treaties influence capital 
flows through the signals they send to international capital markets as shown by empirical model-comparing 
countries that fit “Strong BIT Signal Country” as opposed to “Weak Signal BIT Countries.”). 
 96 Afilalo, supra note 58, at 14. 
 97 Id. 
AFILALO GALLEYPROOFS 5/29/2018 1:11 PM 
2018] FAILED BOUNDARIES 481 
child for the Western investment treaty model.98 With it, Mexico accepted 
takings, national treatment, most favored nation, and minimum standards 
language of the type advocated by the United States—its longstanding foe on 
the investment scene.99 The International Centre for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID) and the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) became the forum for arbitration, under 
the United States’ and World Bank’s respective aegis, of investment disputes.100 
At the end of the day, instead of a single multilateral treaty, thousands of bilateral 
and regional investment alliances arose, giving the West the globalized rules of 
investment protection that it had advocated.101 
C. Investment and Trade Overlap. We Should Care. 
The respective history and theoretical foundations of investment and trade 
should make it clear that there must be a doctrinal boundary between the two 
fields.102 Yet, as it currently stands, the doctrinal expression of the trade and 
investment fields leads to a virtually complete overlap of the two systems.103 As 
the empirical analysis of this Article confirms, where a cause of action exists for 
a state in international trade, a parallel cause of action has a high likelihood of 
prevailing under a bilateral investment treaty.104 “The upshot of collapsing 
investment into trade could be an explosion of high stakes litigation, 
overshadowing and taking over the delicately balanced system of trade 
integration of the WTO.”105 As the European Union’s history has shown, this is 
not an academic scenario.106 The private attorneys general, armed with their 
lawyers, will vigorously pursue individual causes of action arising from states’ 
violations of national treatment, quantitative and like measures, and other core 
trade laws.107 Equating investment with trade would radically unsettle a WTO 
 
 98 Id.; see Justine Daly, Has Mexico Crossed the Border on State Responsibility for Economic Injury to 
Aliens? Foreign Investment and the Calvo Clause in Mexico After the NAFTA, 25 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1147, 1149 
(1994). 
 99 Afilalo, supra note 58, at 14. 
 100 Afilalo, supra note 48, at 421. 
 101  David Deese, Introduction: Politics, Trade, and the International Political Economy, in HANDBOOK 
OF THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRADE 13 (David Deese ed., 2014). 
 102 Nicholas DiMascio & Joost Pauwelyn, Nondiscrimination in Trade and Investment Treaties: Worlds 
Apart or Two Sides of the Same Coin?, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 48, 49–50 (2008). 
 103 Afilalo, supra note 48, at 421. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. 
 106 DiMascio & Pauwelyn, supra note 102, at 53 (“This spike in investment disputes produced something 
of a backlash against BITs, with numerous countries softening their BIT commitments or withdrawing from 
BITs altogether.”). 
 107 Id. 
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system that never contemplated the award of damages to an unlimited class of 
plaintiffs.108 
The problem will be compounded in the United States where attorneys are 
permitted to work on contingency fees.109 The business model of contingency 
fees lends itself very well to investment claims challenging government 
measures.110 States defending complaints will have a strong incentive to settle 
because, as will be illustrated throughout this Article, it will be difficult to 
conclude with certainty that a case has no merit.111 The officials assessing the 
exposure will then, in most instances, have to factor into their calculations some 
likelihood of success on the complainants’ part.112 The magnitude of harm that 
they would face if defeated would more often than not reach very high levels.113 
Discounting the possible damages with the likelihood of success ascribed to the 
case, even if low, would likely yield a high number and, hence, give the 
respondents a strong incentive to settle.114 
In Part II of this Article, I analyze the substantive provisions of the trade and 
investment regimes as well as their dispute resolution mechanisms, and expose 
how the overlap operates doctrinally.  
 
 108  Afilalo, supra note 15, at 32–35; see also Bruce Carolan, The Legislative Backlash to Advances in 
Rights for Same-Sex Couples: Judicial Impediments to Legislating Equality for Same-Sex Couples in the 
European Union, 40 TULSA L. REV. 527, 530 n.18 (2005) (“In essence, this transforms every EU citizen into a 
private attorney general, and greatly enhances the effectiveness (effet utile) of EU law.”). 
 109 W. Kent Davis, The International View of Attorney Fees in Civil Suits: Why Is the United States the 
“Odd Man Out” in How It Pays Its Lawyers?, 16 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. LAW 361, 372 (1999) (“The U.S. is 
unique in its wide use of contingent fees as a method of financing litigation.”). 
 110 Afilalo, supra note 58, at 15. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. “The contingent fee is an extremely common form of paying for the services of lawyers in the U.S.” 
Davis, supra note 109. “In fact, it is now the dominant means of financing cases in many important areas of 
legal practice, including the collection of overdue commercial accounts, stockholder’s suits, class actions, tax 
practice, condemnation proceedings, will contests, and—of course—personal injury litigation.” Id. The fact that 
arbitral panels have discretion to adjudicate claims for substantial damages in proceedings that are less 
transparent than courts increases the likelihood that a contingency lawyer would accept the case in the hope of 
securing a settlement that yields a sufficient contingent fee to justify the venture. 
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II. HOW INVESTMENT CAPTURES TRADE 
A. BITs, FTAs, and MIAs: Substantive Provisions and Dispute Settlement 
Mechanisms 
There are nearly 3,000 bilateral investment treaties (BITs) in force.115 
Commentators have debated the extent to which BITs are indispensable—or 
even relevant—legal means of attracting private foreign investments.116 Yet, the 
financial and commercial map of the world is littered with them.117 Not all BITs 
look alike.118 However, although their overall structure and semantics may vary, 
the global body of investment laws features converging doctrinal hallmarks. 
These treaties usually provide that foreign enterprises should not be treated less 
favorably than similarly situated domestic counterparts and should not make 
“performance requirements” unlawful.119 They require states that expropriate 
 
 115 See JONATHAN BONNITCHA, INT’L INST. SUSTAINABLE DEV., ASSESSING THE IMPACTS OF INVESTMENT 
TREATIES: OVERVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE 1 (2017). Lists of Bilateral Investment Treaties can be found on the 
website of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). International Investment 
Agreements Navigator, INV. POLICY HUB, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA (last visited Mar. 25, 
2018). 
 116 See, e.g., SAMIR AMIN, ACCUMULATION ON A WORLD SCALE: A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORY OF 
UNDERDEVELOPMENT 382 (Brian Pearce trans., Monthly Review Press 1974); IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN, THE 
MODERN WORLD-SYSTEM III: THE SECOND ERA OF GREAT EXPANSION OF THE CAPITALIST WORLD-ECONOMY 
1730–1840S (1989); Afilalo, supra note 15, at 13–19; Jose E. Alvarez, Critical Theory and the North American 
Free Trade Agreement’s Chapter Eleven, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 303, 304 (1997); Kevin Banks, 
NAFTA’s Article 1110 - Can Regulation Be Expropriation?, 5 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 499 (1999); Eduardo Jiménez 
de Aréchaga, State Responsibility for the Nationalization of Foreign Owned Property, 11 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & 
POL. 179 (1978); Sandrino, supra note 66, at 259. 
 117 See IIA Mapping Project, INV. POLICY HUB, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/ 
mappedContent (last visited Mar. 25, 2018). 
 118 See, e.g., Efraim Chalamish, The Future of Bilateral Investment Treaties: A De Facto Multilateral 
Agreement?, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 303 (2009); Jeswald W. Salacuse, Do BITs Really Work?: An Evaluation of 
Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 67 (2005); Stephan W. Schill, 
Multilateralizing Investment Treaties Through Most-Favored-Nation Clauses, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 496 
(2009). 
 119 NAFTA, supra note 24. Several types of performance requirements are explicitly prohibited by Chapter 
11 of NAFTA. See id. For instance, requirements for domestic equity are prohibited under NAFTA Article 
1102(4). Id. art. 1102(4). Requirements for the mandatory transfer of intellectual property, as well as 
requirements for use of minimum levels of domestic content, are prohibited under Article 1106. Id. art. 1106. 
Requirements that specific managerial positions be of a certain nationality are prohibited under Article 1107(1), 
though 1107(2) conditionally allows a requirement for the nationality of a percentage of the board of directors. 
Id. art. 1107(1)–(2). Finally, restrictions on dividend transfers are prohibited under Article 1109(1)(a). Id. art. 
1109(1)(a); see, e.g., Bilateral Investment Treaty, Bol.-U.S., art. VI–VII, Apr. 17, 1998, S. TREATY DOC. No. 
106-25 (prohibiting many kinds of performance requirements); U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV., 
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS: NEW EVIDENCE FROM SELECTED 
COUNTRIES, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2003/7, U.N. Sales No. E.03.II.D.32 (2003) (explaining that 
performance requirements that are not prohibited by the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Investment 
Measures may be addressed in various agreements at the bilateral or regional levels). 
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foreign assets—outright or through regulatory takings—to do so only for a 
public purpose and upon payment of compensation at fair market value.120 They 
also typically include the international minimum standards of protection as a 
catch-all guardian of the security of foreigners’ economic rights.121 On the 
dispute resolution front, BITs122 customarily grant foreign investors the right to 
bring a claim against the host state for violations of the treaty before ICSID,123 
ICSID’s Additional Facility,124 or UNCITRAL.125 
For the purposes of this Article, I use hypothetical provisions of an 
investment treaty inspired by the typical provision of BITs—in particular, 
Chapter 11 of NAFTA, which represents standard language for a BIT.126 For 
national treatment, my treaty provisions state that “[e]ach Party shall accord to 
investors of the other Party and their investments treatment no less favorable 
than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own investors with respect to 
the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and 
 
 120 Compare Bilateral Investment Treaty, Alb.-U.S., art. III(1), Jan. 11, 1995, S. TREATY DOC. No. 104-
19 (prohibiting direct or indirect expropriation or nationalization of foreign investments without compensation), 
with U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating similarly that “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without 
just compensation.”). 
 121 See, e.g., Bilateral Investment Treaty, Croat.-U.S., art. II, July 13, 1996, S. TREATY DOC. No. 106-29 
(establishing standards of protection for foreign investors’ economic security rights in the other state). 
 122 See, e.g., Bilateral Investment Treaty, Ger.-India, July 10, 1995 (1998); Bilateral Investment Treaty, 
China-Japan, Aug. 27, 1988 (1989); Bilateral Investment Treaty, Arg.-U.S., Nov. 14, 1991, S. TREATY DOC. No. 
103-2; U.S. Dep’t of State, Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (2004). 
 123 INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, ICSID CONVENTION, REGULATIONS AND RULES 
(2006), https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/icsiddocs/ICSID%20Convention%20English.pdf. The 
ICSID is an autonomous international institution, established by the Convention on the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes between States and Nationals of other States (Washington Convention), and operating under the World 
Bank, that acts as an impartial international forum for the resolution of legal disputes between Member States 
(or between a Member State and a national of another Member State), either through conciliation or arbitration 
procedures. Id. at 5. 
 124 INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES, ICSID ADDITIONAL FACILITY 
RULES (Sept. 27, 1978), https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/icsiddocs/ICSID-Additional-Facility-Rules.aspx. 
The ICSID Additional Facility is a branch of ICSID established to administer, inter alia, conciliation and 
arbitration proceedings between Member States and non-Member States. Id.  
 125 The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) is the United Nations’ 
international trade division and is mostly concerned with collecting, organizing, and disseminating guidelines 
and conventions for international trade law. U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, A GUIDE TO UNCITRAL 5 
(2013), http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/general/12-57491-Guide-to-UNCITRAL-e.pdf. The 
Washington Convention broke with previous dogma that only states could bring claims against other states. 
INT’L CENT. SETTLEMENT INV. DISP., REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS ON THE CONVENTION ON THE 
SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES BETWEEN STATES AND NATIONALS OF OTHER STATES, art. 33 (Mar. 18, 
1965), https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/icsiddocs/ICSID%20Convention%20English.pdf. There are 
alternative avenues for bringing a claim under ICSID or UNCITRAL rules in addition to BITs, such as 
investment agreements between the state and the investor or investment laws enacted by the state. Id. art. 24. 
However, in such cases the applicable law tends to be the local law as opposed to international law. Id. art. 42(1). 
 126 This Article will use the term “IT” to encompass any possible FTAs, BITs, or MIAs. 
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sale or other disposition of investments.”127 For most favored nation, this 
investment treaty (IT) provides that “each Party shall accord to investors of the 
other Party and their investments treatment no less favorable than that it accords, 
in like circumstances, to investors of any non-Party with respect to the 
establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale 
or other disposition of investments in its territory.”128 
For a minimum standard of treatment, I apply the following typical clause: 
“Each Party shall accord to investments of another Party treatment in accordance 
with customary international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full 
protection and security.”129 For expropriation, my IT will read: “Neither Party 
may expropriate or nationalize a covered investment either directly or indirectly 
through measures equivalent to expropriation or nationalization and tantamount 
measures (“expropriation”), except: (a) for a public purpose; (b) in a non-
discriminatory manner; (c) on payment of prompt, adequate, and effective 
compensation; and (d) in accordance with due process of law. For the avoidance 
of doubt, compensation shall not be deemed to be adequate unless it is equal to 
the fair market value of the expropriated property.” 
And, of course, I assume that, like NAFTA and other BITs, international 
arbitral panels have jurisdiction to hear the case and award damages. 
B. Brief Summary of the GATT Framework 
Article III of the GATT incorporates the familiar national treatment 
provisions of trade law.130 It provides that imported products should receive 
treatment no less favorable by way of taxation or regulation than “like” domestic 
products and that domestic products in competition with imported products 
should not be afforded tax or regulatory treatment that gives them a protective 
advantage over the imported products.131 Article I provides that imported 
 
 127 NAFTA, supra note 24, art. 1102; see also Agreement on Investment under the Framework Agreement 
on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Republic 
of India, ASEAN-India, Nov. 12, 2014, http://www.asean.org/storage/2016/04/ASEAN-India-Investment-
Agreement-ASEAN-version.pdf. 
 128 NAFTA, supra note 24, art. 1103; see also Agreement between Japan and the Oriental Republic of 
Uruguay for the Liberalization, Promotion and Protection of Investment, Japan-Uru., art. 4, Jan. 26, 2015, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000071951.pdf. 
 129 See Free Trade Agreement between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the 
Government of the Republic of Korea, China-S. Kor., Sept. 7, 2007, http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/korea/annex/ 
xdzw_en.pdf. 
 130 GATT, supra note 4, art. III. 
 131 See PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE & WERNER ZDOUC, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION 350–403 (2013). 
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products must be afforded most favored nation treatment,132 meaning that the 
jurisdiction of import may not treat these products less favorably than like 
products from another contracting party.133 Article XI of the GATT bans quotas 
and like measures,134 including a broad array of regulations discussed in Part III, 
such as certain import licensing schemes, bans on certain products deemed 
dangerous to health or other domestic concerns (e.g., asbestos, beef with 
hormones, genetically modified organisms, etc.), and other measures that have 
the effect of quantitatively restricting imports.135 
The SPS provides that sanitary and phytosanitary measures may not give 
imported products less favorable treatment than is afforded to like domestic 
products or like products of another contracting state.136 In addition to this 
traditional discrimination rationale, the SPS provides that, “[m]ember States 
shall ensure that any sanitary or phytosanitary measure is applied only to the 
extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, is based on 
scientific principles and is not maintained without sufficient scientific evidence 
. . . .”137  
The TBT follows a similar logic. It provides that technical regulations may 
not treat imported products less favorably than like products of national origin 
and to like products originating in any other country.138 In addition, it requires 
the Member States to make sure that no “unnecessary obstacles” to trade are 
created by way of technical regulations,139 and it provides incentives for states 
to follow international standards when those exist.140  
 
 132 GATT, supra note 4, art. I. 
 
133
 See BOSSCHE & ZDOUC, supra note 131, at 315–35. 
 
134
 GATT, supra note 4, art. XI. 
 135 Id. Article XI of the GATT generally prohibits quantitative restrictions on the importation or 
exportation of any product, stating “[n]o prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges 
shall be instituted or maintained by any [Member] . . . .” Id. See generally, BOSSCHE & ZDOUC, supra note 131, 
at 481–98. 
 136 SPS Agreement, supra note 21, art. 2.2. 
 137 See Damien J. Neven & Joseph H.H. Weiler, Japan – Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples 
(AB-2003-4): One Bad Apple? (DS245/AB/R): A Comment, in THE WTO CASE LAW OF 2003: THE AMERICAN 
LAW INSTITUTE REPORTERS’ STUDIES 284 (Henrik Horn & Petros C. Mavroidis eds., 2004). 
 138 TBT Agreement, supra note 20, art. 2.1. 
 139 Id. 
 140 Id. art. 2.4 (“Where technical regulations are required and relevant international standards exist or their 
completion is imminent, Members shall use them, or the relevant parts of them, as a basis for their technical 
regulations except when such international standards or relevant parts would be an ineffective or inappropriate 
means for the fulfilment of the legitimate objectives pursued, for instance because of fundamental climatic or 
geographical factors or fundamental technological problems.”). 
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Article XX includes the customary exceptions to the trade disciplines, 
quoted in relevant parts below. 
Provided that they do not violate its chapeau, Article XX protects measures 
that are: 
(a) necessary to protect public morals; 
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; . . .  
(d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are 
not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement, . . .  
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such 
measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on 
domestic production or consumption . . . .141 
C. Why the GATT and NAFTA Are Co-Extensive 
Causes of action arising under Articles I, III, XI of the GATT, or under SPS 
or TBT, may fall within the investment provisions of our IT because: (i) they 
involve treatment less favorable for foreign investors and therefore trigger the 
national treatment provisions of the IT; or (ii) the aggrieved investor may claim 
that the measure so severely deprived it of the benefits of its investment as to 
amount to an expropriation; or (iii) the investor may argue that, under minimum 
standards of international law, it had a legitimate expectation that the host 
jurisdiction would comply with its obligations under a treaty, and that the 
investor made an investment decision in reliance on a particular regulatory 
climate.142 The minimum standards of treatment provisions may, based on the 
facts of the individual case, give the investors additional arguments.143 For 
example, an agency’s failure to grant an import license—its lack of 
transparency, or otherwise its failure to adhere to administrative due process—
may violate the minimum standards of treatment. 
I selected a few cases from investment law to illustrate its overlap with trade 
law. The first group of cases arose under NAFTA’s Investment Chapter (Chapter 
11) in connection with a challenge to Mexican measures that complainants 




 GATT, supra note 4, art. xx. See BOSSCHE & ZDOUC, supra note 131, at 543–82. 
 142 Joshua Robbins, The Emergence of Positive Obligations in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 13 U. MIAMI 
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 403, 417–21 (2006). 
 143 DiMascio & Pauwelyn, supra note 102, at 67. 
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fructose corn syrup (HFCS) producers.144 In the first case, Archer Daniels 
Midland Company and Tate & Lyle Ingredients Americas, Inc., two companies 
formed under the laws of the United States that owned a Mexican subsidiary,145 
challenged a Mexican twenty percent excise tax (the IEPS tax)146 on soft drinks 
and syrups, and services used to transfer and distribute those products.147 The 
tax applied only to drinks and syrups if they used sweeteners other than cane 
sugar, such as HFCS.148 Not surprisingly, HFCS was associated with American 
producers, and cane sugar was associated with Mexican producers.149 The IEPS 
tax remained in effect from January 1, 2002, until 2007 when, as described 
below, Mexico lost the WTO case and removed the measure.150‘ 
The second investment proceeding, brought by Cargill, another American 
company,151 arose out of the same regulatory framework.152 However, the case 
did not focus solely on the IEPS tax and instead examined it in the broader 
context of a Mexican concerted effort to stem the tide of HFCS imports into the 
country. The complainants challenged a decree adopted by Mexico in 2001,153 
pursuant to which HFCS importers from the United States would require a 
permit issued by the Mexican Secretary of the Economy.154 If a given importer 
 
 144 Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/5, Award (Nov. 
21, 2007). 
 145 Id. ¶ 8. 
 146 Id. ¶ 2. In Mexico, the IEPS Amendment (that incorporated IEPS tax) was temporarily suspended by 
Presidential Decree. Id. ¶ 46. On July 12, 2002, the Mexican Supreme Court declared this suspension 
unconstitutional and reinstated the IEPS Amendment. Id. ¶ 83. The IEPS Amendment was also the subject of an 
advisory ruling by the Mexican Commission Federal de Competencia. Id. The IEPS Amendment was also subject 
to a constitutional challenge in the Mexican courts by individual taxpayers, with the result that some soft drink 
bottlers, but not others, are exempt from the tax on the basis of successful amparo challenges. Id. 
 147 Id. ¶ 2. 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. ¶¶ 6–8. 
 150 Appellate Body Report, Mexico–Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, 173, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS308/AB/R (Mar. 6, 2006) (addressing the legality under international trade law of tax measures on soft 
drinks and other beverages, further discussed in Part II). This case arose after Mexico continued to come up with 
measures to protect its sugarcane industry, following the invalidation of previous anti-dumping measures by the 
WTO and a NAFTA tribunal convened under Chapter 19. Id.  
 151 Cargill, Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/05/2, Final Award (Sept. 18, 2009). 
There is also a third case brought by Corn Products International, Inc., but the award is not public. Corn Products 
Int’l, Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/01, Decision on Responsibility (Jan. 15, 
2008). 
 152 Cargill, Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/05/2, Final Award, ¶ 1 (Sept. 18, 
2009). Cargill, incorporated in the United States, sold HFCS through its subsidiary Cargill de Mexico, S.A. de 
C.V. Id.  
 153  Cargill also brought a claim under the most-favored-nation provisions of Article 1103, which the 
Tribunal rejected. Id. ¶¶ 227–34.  
 154 Id. ¶ 117. 
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did not have a permit, its products would be subject to a higher tariff than the 
NAFTA tariff.155 
The same measures were also challenged by states before the WTO, with the 
DSB finding against Mexico on this trade front.156 The DSB Panel found that 
the IEPS tax violated the national treatment obligations of Mexico under Article 
III:4 of the GATT.157 It held that (1) soft drinks containing HFCS are “like” soft 
drinks containing cane sugar, and the tax on soft drinks with HFCS was in excess 
of taxes imposed on the like domestic products and (2) HFCS and sugar are 
directly competitive or substitutable products, and dissimilar taxation was 
applied in a way that offered protection to domestic products.158 Mexico 
defended the IEPS tax under the Article XX(d) exception with an argument that 
the measures were necessary to secure compliance with NAFTA itself. Mexico 
claimed that the United States had violated NAFTA and retaliation was the only 
means of securing American compliance with the treaty.159 The Panel rejected 
the Mexican argument and held that the term “laws or regulations” under Article 
XX(d) refers to the rules that form part of the domestic legal order (including 
domestic legislative acts intended to implement international obligations) of the 
WTO Member invoking Article XX(d) and do not cover obligations of another 
WTO Member (here, the United States’ obligations under NAFTA).160 The 
Appellate Body (AB) upheld the Panel’s conclusions.161 
In the NAFTA investment cases, Mexico also argued that the case belonged 
to a trade—not an investment—dispute-resolution framework.162 Mexico argued 
that a claim related to the imposition of a permit requirement was beyond the 
jurisdiction of the tribunal because it involved the trade of goods and was 
 
 155 Id.  
 156 Appellate Body Report, Mexico—Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, ¶ 9.4, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS308/R (adopted Oct. 7, 2005). 
 157 Id. ¶¶ 9.2(a)(iii) & 9.2(b). 
 158 Id. ¶ 9.2. 
 159 Id. ¶ 9.3. 
 160 As explained in greater detail below, Cargill brought a broader challenge under NAFTA to a series of 
measures adopted by Mexico as part of its anti-HFCS campaign, including prominently import permit 
requirements. Cargill, Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/05/2, Final Award, ¶ 299 (Sept. 
18, 2009) (“Reviewing closely the record of this case, the Tribunal finds ample support for the conclusion that 
the import permit was one of a series of measures expressly intended to injure United States HFCS producers 
and suppliers in Mexico in an effort to persuade the United States government to change its policy on sugar 
imports from Mexico.”). 
 161 Appellate Body Report, Mexico—Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, supra note 156, 
¶ 9.5. 
 162 Cargill, Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/05/2, Final Award, ¶ 136 (Sept. 18, 
2009). 
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governed by NAFTA Chapter 3, not Chapter 11.163 Chapter 3 was the NAFTA 
replica of the GATT provisions invoked before the WTO, and Mexico 
essentially asked the arbitration panel to establish a boundary between the two 
domains.164 The NAFTA Tribunal found for the claimant and rejected the 
argument that the case belonged exclusively to a trade venue.165  
The Tribunal held that the existence of separate regimes applicable to trade 
in goods/services and investment does not ipso facto mean that there can be no 
overlap between the two.166 It found that HFCS and cane sugar producers 
operated in “like circumstances” due to the competitive relationship between 
them.167 In these circumstances, the Tribunal ruled, the IEPS tax was 
discriminatory and designed to afford protection to the domestic sugarcane 
industry.168 These findings translated into a violation of the national treatment 
provisions of Article 1102.169 The Tribunal also found a violation of the 
performance requirements of Article 1106(3) because the IEPS tax exempted 
soft drinks using cane sugar contingent upon the use of domestic products.170 
While the IEPS tax conferred advantages on sugar without discrimination 
between foreign and domestic investors, the reality was that the sugar industry 
in Mexico was essentially domestic and the disparate impact on the foreign 
producers warranted a finding of national treatment violation.171 The Tribunal 
rejected Mexico’s countermeasures defense for the same reason as the WTO did, 
finding that the IEPS tax was not taken to induce U.S. compliance with its 
NAFTA obligations, but rather to protect domestic industry.172  
In the second NAFTA proceeding, Cargill’s broader level challenge to the 
Mexican anti-HFCS campaign focused in particular on the import permit 
requirement that Mexico adopted in addition to the IEPS tax.173 The Tribunal 
found that the “import permit was one of the series of measures expressly 
intended to injure U.S. HFCS producers and suppliers in Mexico in an effort to 
 
 163 Id. ¶ 191. 
 164 NAFTA, supra note 24, at ch. 23.  
 165 Cargill, Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/05/2, Final Award, ¶ 193 (Sept. 18, 
2009). 
 166 Id. ¶ 148. 
 167 Id. ¶ 211. 
 168 Id. ¶¶ 219–20. 
 169 Id. ¶ 223. 
 170 Id. ¶¶ 313, 316, 319. 
 171 Id. ¶¶ 317–18. 
 172 Id. ¶ 412. The Tribunal did not find that Mexico had expropriated the claimants’ investment because 
the measure of interference was not substantial enough—the Claimants remained in control of their investment 
in Mexico throughout the entire relevant time period. Id. ¶¶ 317–18, 348, 363. 
 173 Id. ¶¶ 224–25. 
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persuade the U.S. government to change its policy on sugar imports from 
Mexico.”174 The Tribunal concluded that the introduction of the permit 
requirement was a manifestly unjust measure because its sole purpose was to 
persuade the United States to change its trade practices.175 By imposing such an 
import requirement, Mexico targeted few suppliers of HFCS that originated in 
the United States and made them carry the burden of Mexico’s efforts to 
influence U.S. policy.176 The Tribunal called such practice “willful targeting” 
that, by its nature, constituted a manifest injustice in violation of its obligation 
to offer fair and equitable treatment under Article 1105 (minimum standards of 
treatment).177 Furthermore, the Tribunal found this measure to amount to gross 
misconduct because, when adopting the permit requirement, the Mexican 
government did not introduce objective criteria according to which the company 
could obtain an import permit.178 
These companion cases illustrate the doctrinal overlap between the treaties. 
This is by no means the only controversy that raises the issue. While it is beyond 
the scope of this Article to engage in a comprehensive review, I will review a 
few other cases to further exemplify the doctrinal construct that my empirical 
study confirms. 
In Ethyl v. Canada,179 a Virginia corporation with a Canadian subsidiary 
argued that a Canadian statute banning imports of the gasoline additive MMT 
violated Canada’s obligations under NAFTA Chapter 11.180 Ethyl, the claimant, 
argued that Canada had violated national treatment (Article 1102), prohibition 
of expropriation (Article 1110), and the rules against performance requirements 
(Article 1106).181 Ethyl claimed $251,000,000 in damages to cover the losses 
associated with its inability to sell MMT made in its production plant and the 
prejudice to its goodwill.182 In addition to asserting various procedural 
 
 174 Id. ¶ 299. 
 175 Id. 
 176 Id. ¶ 300. 
 177 Id. ¶¶ 2, 300, 550. 
 178 Id. ¶ 301. The Tribunal rejected the most-favored nation claim made by Cargill on technical grounds. 
Id. ¶¶ 284, 286, 298, 301. 
 179 Ethyl Corp. v. The Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, Award On Jurisdiction (June 24, 1998), 38 
I.L.M. 708, 722, ¶¶ 3–4 (1999). 
 180 The statute prohibited international trade of or import of MMT for commercial purposes except under 
authorization under Section 5. Section 5 precluded any authorizations for additions to unleaded gasoline. 
Meanwhile, production and sale of MMT in Canada were not prohibited. Id. ¶¶ 5–6. 
 181 Id. ¶¶ 7, 18. 
 182 Id. ¶¶ 71–73. See Patricia Isela Hansen, The Interplay Between Trade and the Environment Within the 
NAFTA Framework, in ENVIRONMENT, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 326 (Fracesco Francioni, 
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defenses,183 Canada also argued that the ban was justified by concerns about the 
environmental and health risks associated with MMT.184 Canada and Ethyl 
settled the Chapter 11 claim in 1998 before proceeding to the merits.185 Under 
the settlement, the Canadian government agreed to withdraw the legislation and 
to pay Ethyl $13 million in compensation.186 This is a case that could have been 
a run-of-the-mill WTO filing. Although it was prompted in part by the domestic 
proceedings, its settlement also exemplifies the incentive that governments may 
have to compromise, despite a potentially strong defense of the merits of the 
claim.187 
In Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada,188 a U.S. investor with a Canadian 
subsidiary that operated softwood lumber mills in British Columbia filed a claim 
against Canada in an UNCITRAL tribunal alleging that Canada’s 
implementation of the U.S.-Canada Softwood Lumber Agreement (SLA) 
violated its national treatment and minimum standard of treatment.189 Under the 
 
ed., Hart Publishing 2001). Ethyl’s claim for $251,000,000 was the first significant claim involving a challenge 
to an environmental regulation brought following adoption of the NAFTA. Id. 
 183 Id. ¶¶ 12–14. Canada argued that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction over the dispute as it is out of the 
scope of Chapter 11 of NAFTA and that the claimant failed to fulfill requirements of Section B of Chapter 11. 
Id. ¶ 12. Ethyl defended jurisdiction of the Tribunal by arguing that all the requirements of Chapter 11 for 
arbitration procedure were met by the time of hearing. Id. ¶ 46. As for the scope of Chapter 11, the claimant 
argued that it challenged measures against it within the territory of Canada for which it is entitled to 
compensation, including for damages resulting from the act outside of Canada. Id. ¶ 27. The Tribunal agreed 
with Ethyl that this argument was not critical enough to be decided on the procedural stage, and it did not reject 
Ethyl’s claim on that ground. Id. ¶ 64. The Tribunal noted that the MMT Act was the realization of the 
governmental program that had been sustained over a long period of time, and, in any event, by the time of 
commencement of arbitration, the government had a “measure” adopted or maintained within the meaning of 
Article 1101. Id. ¶ 69. Part of Ethyl’s claim was that the damages it had suffered included losses outside the 
territory of Canada. Id. ¶ 72. The Tribunal joined Canada’s objections related to damages suffered outside of 
Canada and to the trade nature of the dispute to the merits phase and rejected other objections. Id. ¶ 96. 
 184 See id. ¶ 21. 
 185 Ethyl Corporation v. The Government of Canada, GLOBAL AFFAIRS CANADA, http://www. 
international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/topics-domaines/disp-diff/ethyl.aspx?lang=eng 
(last visited Mar. 25, 2018). 
 186 Alan C. Swan, Ethyl Corporation v. Canada, Award on Jurisdiction (under NAFTA/UNCITRAL), 94 
AM. J. INT’L L. 159, 161 (2000). 
 187 See Ethyl Corp. v. The Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, Award On Jurisdiction (June 24, 1998), 
38 I.L.M. 708, 722, ¶¶ 3–4 (1999). 
 188 Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. The Government of Canada, Award on the Merits of Phase 2 (Apr. 10, 2001), 
40 ILM 258 (2001); Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, Interim Award (June 26, 2000), 40 I.L.M. 258 (2001). 
 189 Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. The Government of Canada, Award on the Merits of Phase 2, ¶¶ 105–06 (Apr. 
10, 2001), 40 ILM 258. The claimant also argued for violations of Article 1106 (“Performance Requirements”) 
and Article 1110 (“Expropriation”). Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, Interim Award, ¶¶ 45, 47, 81 (June 26, 
2000), 40 I.L.M. 258 (2001). The Tribunal rejected both claims. Id. ¶¶ 70–72, 76, 79. Although it agreed that 
access to the U.S. market is a property interest covered by Article 1110, it found no expropriation, because the 
degree of interference with the Investments’ business was not substantial enough to be qualified as expropriation. 
Id. ¶¶ 96, 99, 102, 104. It should be noted that Pope & Talbot also originally alleged violation of MFN treatment, 
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SLA, Canada agreed to charge a fee on exports of softwood lumber in excess of 
a certain number of board feet.190 According to Pope & Talbot, Canada’s 
allocation of a fee-free quota was unfair and inequitable.191 It argued that its 
investment was subjected to threats, its reasonable requests for information were 
denied, it incurred unreasonable expenses, and it suffered loss of reputation in 
government circles.192 It also claimed that discriminatory treatment arose out of 
transitional adjustment provisions, unfair allocation of quota related to 
wholesale exports, inequitable reallocation of quota for British Columbia 
companies, and Canada’s breach of administrative fairness.193 
The Tribunal found a violation of the minimum standards of protection but 
not of national treatment.194 It held that the administrative audit undertaken as 
part of export control regulation, to verify Pope & Talbot’s quota, amounted to 
denial of fair and equitable treatment.195 Regarding national treatment, after 
concluding that Canada’s treatment of Pope & Talbot’s investment should be 
compared with the treatment of other producers of softwood lumber in covered 
provinces, it found that Canada’s policies for new entrants and fees did not 
discriminate against the foreign investors.196 Pope & Talbot had claimed 
damages totaling over $507 million (USD) and the Tribunal awarded it with 
$461,566 (USD) in damages with interest on the findings of violation.197 It is 
likely that, had the claimant prevailed in its national treatment claim, the 
damages would have been higher.  
One of Canada’s main defenses was that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction 
because there was no “investment dispute” within the meaning of Article 1115 
due to the fact that the dispute was related to trade in goods.198 Drawing on 
interpretive practices for Article XX of the GATT, Canada claimed that its 
measures did not relate to investment because “relate to” should be construed to 
 
but this claim was dropped by the time the interim award was issued. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. The Government 
of Canada, Award on the Merits of Phase 2, ¶ 39 (Apr. 10, 2001), 40 ILM 258. 
 190 Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, Interim Award, ¶ 22 (June 26, 2000), 40 I.L.M. 258 (2001). 
 191 Id. ¶ 150. 
 192 Id. ¶ 181. 
 193 Id. ¶¶ 122, 124, 126, 182. 
 194 Id. ¶¶ 88, 94–95, 118. 
 195 The Tribunal found that Canada particularly breached NAFTA in the course of the quota audit when it 
asked Pope & Talbot to ship its Canadian company’s records back to Canada. Id. ¶¶ 160, 165, 171. 
 196 Id. ¶¶ 126–28. 
 197 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, Diplomacy in Action: Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Government of Canada, 
https://www.state.gov/s/l/c3747.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2018). 
 198 Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Government of Canada, Award by Arbitration Tribunal with Relation to 
Preliminary Motion by Government of Canada (Jan. 26, 2000), ¶ 12(1), 40 I.L.M. 258 (2001).  
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mean “primarily aimed at.”199 Therefore, Canada claimed, the impact of the SLA 
and Canada’s export regime on an investor’s operations were not sufficient to 
support the conclusion that the measures related to investment.200 The Tribunal, 
however, concluded that all elements of a proper investment dispute were met; 
with respect to the relationship between trade and investment, the Tribunal found 
that Chapter 11’s reference to rules on the “treatment of investments with respect 
to the management, conduct and operation of investments is wide enough to 
relate to measures specifically directed at goods produced by a particular 
investment.”201 This is exactly the point: investment and trade law deal with the 
same activities. The WTO speaks to states about trade in goods and services,202 
and BITs speak to the private economic actors carrying on trade.203 
In many instances, the investor will also be able to claim an expropriation, 
or a measure tantamount to an expropriation, going beyond the causes of action 
permitted by domestic law under open-ended provisions of an IT.204 In Methanex 
v. United States,205 for instance, a Canadian maker of methanol, which is 
occasionally used as a gasoline additive, argued that the legislation lacked a 
proper scientific basis and amounted to a complete deprivation of the right to do 
business in California in violation of NAFTA’s Investment Chapter’s takings 
rules.206 In Loewen v. United States,207 the claimant argued that a Mississippi 
trial resulting in an enormous amount of punitive damages violated due process 
norms, amounting to a taking of property.208 In both cases, the complainant 
sought hundreds of millions of dollars in damages,209 and in both cases the 
 
 199 Id. ¶ 28. 
 200 Id. ¶ 28. 
 201 Id. ¶ 26. 
 202 See Marrakesh Agreement, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 (establishing the WTO). 
 203 See OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, Bilateral Investment Treaties, 
https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/bilateral-investment-treaties# (last visited Mar. 25, 2018). 
 204 See Methanex Corp. v. United States, Final Award of the Tribunal on Jurisdiction and Merits, 44 I.L.M. 
1345 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2005); The Loewen Group, Inc. & Raymond L. Loewen v. United States, 
ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Award (June 26, 2003). 
 205 Methanex Corp. v. United States, Final Award of the Tribunal on Jurisdiction and Merits, 44 I.L.M. 
1345 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2005). 
 206 Id. ¶ 24. 
 207 The Loewen Group, Inc. & Raymond L. Loewen v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, 
Notice of Claim, ¶ 16 (Oct. 30, 1998). 
 208 Id. ¶¶ 7-8. 
 209 Methanex Corp. v. United States, Final Award of the Tribunal on Jurisdiction and Merits, 44 I.L.M. 
1345, ¶ 2 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2005); The Loewen Group, Inc. & Raymond L. Loewen v. United States, 
ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Notice of Claim, ¶ 187 (Oct. 30, 1998). 
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complainants did not even come close to having a domestic cause of action.210 
While the arbitrators ultimately rejected those claims, all of the cases proceeded 
to the awards stage, and a different panel may well have ruled in their favor.211 
Even when the complainants are ultimately unsuccessful on the merits, the 
overlap between trade and investment creates massive exposure of the defending 
states to protracted litigation. The “plain packaging litigation” against Australia 
illustrates this claim. On the investment front, Philip Morris Asia (PM Asia) 
challenged Australia’s “plain packaging” laws212 under the Agreement between 
the Government of Hong Kong and the Government of Australia for the 
Promotion and Protection of Investments of 1993.213 The plain packaging laws 
severely restricted the ability of a cigarette manufacturer to use its brand, logos, 
or designs on a cigarette pack.214 They required that all cigarettes be sold under 
plain, drab brown, unattractive packaging.215 They also prohibited the use of 
graphics and logos on the package.216 In addition to the investment rules, 
Australia’s plain packaging laws were challenged before the WTO by several 
states, including the European Union, Brazil, Egypt, the Ukraine, Honduras, the 
Dominican Republic, and New Zealand, among others.217  
 
 210 Methanex Corp. v. United States, Final Award of the Tribunal on Jurisdiction and Merits, 44 I.L.M. 
1345, Part IV, ch. F, ¶ 2 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2005); The Loewen Group, Inc. & Raymond L. Loewen v. 
United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Notice of Claim, ¶ 240 (Oct. 30, 1998). 
 211 See generally Methanex Corp. v. United States, Final Award of the Tribunal on Jurisdiction and Merits, 
44 I.L.M. 1345 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2005); The Loewen Group, Inc. & Raymond L. Loewen v. United 
States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Award (June 26, 2003). 
 212 Tobacco Plain Packaging Bill 2011 (Cth) and Trade Marks Amendment (Tobacco Plain Packaging) 
Bill 2011 (Cth). See Philip Morris Asia Initiates Legal Action Against the Australian Government Over Plain 
Packaging, WEB WIRE (June 27, 2011), https://www.webwire.com/ViewPressRel.asp?aId=140252. 
 213 Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Austl.-H.K., Sept. 15, 1993, 1748 
U.N.T.S. 385; Written Notification of Claim by Philip Morris Asia Limited to the Commonwealth of Australia 
pursuant to Agreement between the Government of Hong Kong and the Government of Australia for the 
Promotion and Protection of Investments (July 15, 2011) [hereinafter Written Notification of Claim]. 
 214 Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 (Cth) (Austl.). 
 215 Id. § 19. 
 216 Id. ch. 1, § 4; id. ch. 2, § 20. 
 217 Request for Consultations by Ukraine, Australia–Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks and Other 
Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and Packaging, WTO Doc. WT/DS434/1 (Mar. 
15, 2012) [hereinafter Australia–Trademarks and Other Plain Packaging Requirements, Request by Ukraine]; 
Request for Consultations by Honduras, Australia–Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks and Other Plain 
Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and Packaging, WTO Doc. WT/DS435/1 (Apr. 10, 
2012) [hereinafter Australia–Trademarks and Other Plain Packaging Requirements, Request by Honduras]; 
Request for Consultations by the Dominican Republic, Australia–Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks, 
Geographical Indications and Other Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and 
Packaging, WTO Doc. WT/DS441/1 (July 23, 2012) [hereinafter Australia–Trademarks and Other Plain 
Packaging Requirements, Request by Dominican Republic]. 
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The main arguments of the complaining states before the DSB were brought 
under the TBT and TRIPS. As to the TBT, the states claimed that the measures 
amounted to a technical barrier to trade because they severely hindered sales of 
branded cigarettes in Australia, and that they were more restrictive than 
necessary to achieve Australia’s health objective.218 Depriving cigarette brand 
owners of their normal packaging, logos, and branding, they claimed, will hurt 
their sales but will not decrease smoking significantly.219 Instead of 
distinguishing the products by branding habits, smokers would do so through 
product pricing.220 In turn, this would favor cheaper, domestic cigarettes, using 
lesser quality tobacco.221 As to TRIPS, the complainants argued that Australia’s 
measures thwarted the right of cigarette makers to use their brand for customary 
product identification purposes, thereby depriving them of the normal benefits 
of a trademark registration.222 
The investment filings by PM Asia followed a similar structure and, 
additionally, raised investment-specific causes of action.223 PM Asia was 
incorporated in Hong Kong with the goal of benefitting from the Hong Kong–
Australia treaty, and it owned shares in Philip Morris Australia Limited (PM 
Australia) as its “investment” in Australia.224 PM Asia argued that Australia 
expropriated its valuable intellectual property by banning the normal use of a 
trademark to brand intellectual property on tobacco products and packaging.225 
It also claimed a violation of the minimum standards of treatment of 
international investment law on the grounds that Australia violated international 
treaties such as the TBT and the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial 
Property.226 PM Asia translated its trade claims into investment language by 
arguing that, when it chose to do business in Australia, it had a legitimate 
expectation that Australia would abide by its obligations under international 
economic law.227 By rejecting and failing to abide by those obligations, PM Asia 
claimed that Australia deprived it of basic assumptions upon which its 
 
 218 See Australia–Trademarks and Other Plain Packaging Requirements, Request by Dominican Republic, 
supra note 217. 
 219 See Written Notification of Claim, supra note 213.  
 220 See id. 
 221 See Request for Consultations by the Dominican Republic, supra note 217. 
 222 Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Australia, PCA Case No. 2012-12, Notice of Arbitration, UNCITRAL, ¶ 39 
(Nov. 21, 2011). 
 223 Id. ¶ 1.2. 
 
224
 Id. ¶ 1.3. 
 
225
 Id. ¶¶ 7.3–7.5. 
 
226
  Id. ¶¶ 7.6–7.8. 
 
227
  Id. ¶ 6.5. 
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investment in that country relied.228 As a result of the violations, PM Asia 
alleged it was entitled to compensation “in an amount to be quantified but of the 
order of billions of Australian dollars.”229 
In both the arbitral claim and the WTO proceeding, the tribunal sided with 
Australia and held that Philip Morris treaty-shopped to bring a baseless 
complaint about the exercise of legitimate regulatory power that had been in the 
works for a substantial amount of time. 230 Australia’s massive legal efforts to 
defend the case, the length of years it lasted, and the staggering exposure in the 
event of a loss ($15 billion AUS) illustrate the sensitivity of allowing challenges 
of this type to proceed to arbitration.231 Treaty-shopping, a longstanding 
participation of PM in regulatory preparations for harsher tobacco measures, and 
the sensitive health concerns at issue, made it a case where the investor had a 
low likelihood of success. More sympathetic plaintiffs may be able to prove 
legitimate expectations and an actionable breach of international law in cases 
where a state has changed its domestic policies or law.  
In another case, the investment tribunal may strike a different balance 
between investor expectations and the state’s regulatory space to change course. 
Line drawing is a delicate exercise, and the location of the boundary will depend 
on the factual circumstances, individual philosophies, and predilections of the 
arbitrators.232 There will be plenty of instances where the investor, in a case that 




  Id. ¶¶ 6.2–6.12, 45. 
 229  Id. ¶ 8.3. 
 230 Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Australia, PCA Case No. 2012-12, 25, 47–50, Australia’s Response to the 
Notice of Arbitration, UNCITRAL, ¶ 48 (Dec. 21, 2011). 
 231 See Valentina S. Vadi, Global Health Governance at a Crossroads: Trademark Protection v. Tobacco 
Control in International Investment Law, 48 STAN. J. INT’L L. 93, 128 (2012) (discussing the chilling effect of 
investment treaties and reporting case studies to the effect that, unless properly limited by jurisprudence, 
“investment treaty guarantees may negatively affect tobacco control policies as investors may claim that tobacco 
control measures infringe their rights”); see also Wagner, supra note 48. 
 232 See, e.g., William T. Waren, Paying to Regulate: A Guide to Methanex v. United States and NAFTA 
Investor Rights, 31 E.L.R. 10986. Methanex illustrates the “risk to States” because, “[g]iven the largely 
undefined standards of NAFTA’s investment chapter, the arbitrators have room to read its language broadly or 
narrowly.” Id. International Thunderbird, which involved a ruling granted by a Mexican government agency 
allowing Thunderbird to operate its gaming machines in Mexico as “games of skill” rather than prohibited games 
of “chance,” provides an excellent illustration of the risk faced by states. International Thunderbird Gaming 
Corp. v. United Mexican States, Arbitral Award, UNCITRAL/NAFTA, ¶ 102 (Dec. 2005). When its ruling was 
canceled, Thunderbird challenged the adverse government action under NAFTA. Id. The majority took the view 
that Thunderbird had assumed the risk of a reversal of government policy, whereas the dissent argued that 
Mexico had provided sufficiently strong assurances to the investor to create legitimate expectations, and it would 
allocate the risk to the State. Id. The different outcomes are direct results of the arbitrators’ exercise of their 
discretion to evaluate how much regulatory space the defending State has to change policy course. Id. 
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breach.233 Consider, for example, the separate opinion filed by a dissenting 
arbitrator in International Thunderbird:  
Throughout the extensive jurisprudence surveyed, we find that if 
governments reverse their previously communicated and relied upon 
course, a balancing process takes place between the strength of 
legitimate expectations (stronger if an investment for the future has 
been committed) and the very legitimate goal of retaining “policy 
space” and governmental flexibility.234  
This arbitrator strongly held that the balancing in that case favored the 
complainants, while his colleagues sheltered the regulatory space that he 
described.235 
In Part III, I show, applying my hypothetical investment treaty provisions, 
how the overlap between trade and investment results in the “capture” by the 
investment treaty of most WTO cases.  
III. CASE ANALYSIS 
A. A Few More Introductory Comments on Classification 
I have reviewed both decided trade cases and cases that were settled before 
reaching the Panel or AB stage. I grouped cases either by industry or by subject 
matter. Food, liquor, automotive, clean energies, textiles, tobacco, and other 
industries have been the focus of multiple WTO filings. Patent, trademark, and 
like cases are better categorized by subject matter (intellectual property). Some 
cases did not fall readily into one category or another and are included in a 
“General Market Access” catch-all category. My categorization judgments, I 
believe, fulfill the purpose of the exercise, which is to show that in every major 
group of WTO cases discussed in this Article, there is a strong likelihood that a 
parallel cause of action is available.  
 
 233 As this Article demonstrates, there is a near-perfect correlation between national treatment for trade 
and for investment. See generally Afilalo, supra note 15 (setting forth the theoretical argument that this Article 
proves empirically). 
 234 International Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican States, Arbitral Award, 
UNCITRAL/NAFTA, ¶ 102 (Dec. 2005) (separate opinion of Thomas Wälde). 
 235 Id. ¶ 5 (“[The arbitrators in the majority] see the glass of the investor half empty, I rather see it as half 
full. They imply a very high level of due diligence, of knowledge of local conditions and of government risk to 
be taken by the investor. I rather see the government as responsible for providing a clear message and of sticking 
to the message once given and as reasonably understood by the investor.”). 
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In determining whether to classify a case as Trade Positive, Investment 
Positive, or Potentially Positive, I kept in mind the purpose of this first stage of 
my project: determining the extent to which a legitimate cause of action under 
investment law may arise from the same core operative facts as the trade cases. 
I did not seek to argue conclusively whether the investment case would be 
successful if brought to completion. As the International Thunderbird dissent 
shows, different panels of arbitrators may reach different results based on their 
general understanding of the purpose of investment law.236 Also, many trade 
cases did not go beyond the request for consultations stage and did not include 
a fully developed record.237 This made it difficult to predict with accuracy how 
a panel would rule on either the trade or investment side.  
I placed myself in the observation point of a summary judgment tribunal 
determining not only whether sufficient facts were in dispute to proceed to trial, 
but also whether the ultimate decision maker may find a legal violation 
depending on his or her conclusions as to a legal standard that is in a state of 
flux and is, thus, uncertain. In making judgments as to individual cases, I tried 
to strike a balance between over-caution and enthusiastically piling up Positives. 
Both extremes may have skewed the analysis, either towards finding less of a 
correlation than actually exists or more.  
To avoid those tendencies, I adhered to the following principles and 
guidelines. First, to be Trade Positive, the WTO proceedings must have either 
(i) resulted in a ruling in favor of the claimant, or (ii) if the case was resolved 
before a Panel or Appellate Body ruling, stood a good chance of being decided 
in favor of the claimant under established principles of WTO law accepting as 
true the allegations made in the request for consultations. Second, I considered 
all cases that involve sensitive issues of state sovereignty—even if the WTO 
chose or would likely choose to uphold the complainants’ interests in the face of 
the sovereignty issues—as serious candidates for a downgrade to Investment 
Potentially Positive or Negative status. I assumed that an arbitral tribunal 
awarding monetary damages to a private party in a proceeding against a state 
will be even more sensitive to concerns of conflicting state policies than a WTO 
Panel or the Appellate Body. Third, and conversely, I have not hesitated to 
classify cases as Investment Positive where the allegations of protectionism are 
not counterbalanced by any legitimate state interest that appears on the available 
 
 236 Id. ¶ 8. 
 237 See, e.g., cases cited infra at notes 242–49. The tables setting forth the cases reviewed for purposes of 
this project will illustrate the extent to which a substantial number of filings do not go beyond the Request for 
Consultations stage.  
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record, or when the case appears to raise familiar allegations of economic 
protectionism unrelated to any trade-legitimate state interest. 
The majority of cases that were presented to the WTO did not involve 
extraordinary conflicts between national interests and international trade. As 
trade students, we tend to focus on the difficult, borderline cases that raise the 
most interesting and provocative issues. The actual review of the cases, however, 
tells a different narrative. It reflects the leaps and bounds through which the 
world’s economies have become gradually intertwined and the barriers that 
world trade has broken down to get there.  
B. The Liquor Cases 
Most students of trade will read at least a few liquor cases. A highly lucrative 
industry, it is also home to cultural biases and stereotypes. For example, the 
French drink wine while the Brits will not take a wine cooler to Old Trafford, 
even if they were paid to do so. The Japanese will not switch from shochu to 
vodka, even though the liquids look quite similar. Neither will the Chileans turn 
away from pisco, nor the Koreans from soju. Yet, all liquor cases are easy to 
classify as Trade Positives. Time and again, the WTO has received notifications 
and/or adjudicated complaints that a contracting party crafted taxation or 
regulation that discriminated against foreign liquor in favor of a popular brand 
of alcohol.238  
These cases resulted or would result if adjudicated in a violation of 
international trade rules principally because they tend to share the following 
hallmarks. First, they do not implicate weighty concerns of national sovereignty. 
In fact, they may not implicate any concern other than the protection of domestic 
liquor (wine in France, beer in England, shochu in Japan, soju in Korea, etc.) 
that local consumers have a habit of using and that are culturally associated with 
the defending states. Second, the taxation or regulation scheme, although drafted 
neutrally from a formal standpoint (e.g., imposing a higher tax based on 
manufacturing processes but not naming the foreign liquor made by these 
processes), has a substantially disparate impact on the foreign liquor. There is 
no doubt that, when the tax is applied to domestic and foreign categories of 
products, the foreign product is discriminated against de facto. Third, consumer 
preferences fall squarely on the side of the domestic liquor. However, the 
taxation or regulation providing it with more favorable competitive conditions 
 
 238 See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, Japan–Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WTO Doc. WT/DS8/AB/R, 
WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/R (Oct. 4, 1996) [hereinafter 1996 Japan-Alcoholic Beverages AB Report]. 
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may have calcified the choice by making it financially logical and creating a 
habit of purchase. Mexicans might drink tequila and the French may sip wine, 
but they might shift in time to foreign liquor if the prices are equalized. (Who 
would have thought four decades ago that wine bars would become popular in 
London?) The trade tribunals’ job is to create the legal playing field to unleash 
those forces of integration. Fourth, the likeness analysis under the WTO/GATT 
may involve formal differences between the products at issue (e.g., their alcohol 
content), their use as digestives as opposed to cocktails, or the manufacturing 
processes or raw materials used, but it will not be conclusive. Similarly, because 
of the cultural biases, the consumer preferences analysis may show definitive 
results as to the tastes of the consumer at a given point in time. However, the 
structural price discrimination underlying the preference will make these 
findings inconclusive because the trade tribunal will not know the extent to 
which historical pricing differentials drove tastes and if changes in pricing will 
transform the market and level the playing field.  
For these reasons, it is not surprising that the cases are all Trade Positive and 
Investment Positive:  
 
Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverage–Shochu239 TP IP 
Korea—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages–Soju240 TP IP 
DS 87 & DS 110: Chile—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages–
Pisco241 
TP IP 
DS 261: Uruguay—Tax Treatment on Certain Products242 TP IP 
DS 263: European Communities—Measures Affecting the 
Import of Wine243 
TP IP 
 
 239 Appellate Body Report, Japan–Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, 
WT/D11/R (October 4, 1996). 
 240 Appellate Body Report, Korea–Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS75/AB/R, WT/DS84/AB/R, 
(October 18, 1999). 
 241 Appellate Body Report, Chile—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS87/AB/R, WT/DS110/AB/R 
(Dec. 13, 1999); Request for Consultations by the United States, Chile–Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WTO 
Doc. WT/DS109/1 (Dec. 16, 1997). 
 242  Request for Consultations by Chile, Uruguay–Tax Treatment on Certain Products, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS261/1 (June 2, 2002). 
 243  Request for Consultations by Argentina, European Communities–Measures Affecting Imports of Wine, 
WTO Doc. WT/DS263/1 (Sept. 12, 2002). 
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DS 352: India—Measures Affecting the Importation and 
Sale of Wines and Spirits from the European 
Communities244 
TP IP 
DS 354: Canada—Tax Exemptions and Reductions for 
Wine and Beer245 
TP IP 
Thailand—Customs Valuation of Certain Products from 
the European Communities 
TP IP 
DS 380: India—Certain Taxes and Other Measures on 
Imported Wines and Spirits246 
TP IP 
DS 396 & DS 403: Philippines—Taxes on Distilled 
Spirits247 
TP IP 
DS 411: Armenia—Measures Affecting the Importation 
and Internal Sale of Cigarettes and Alcoholic Beverages248 
TP IP 
DS 423: Ukraine—Taxes on Distilled Spirits249 TP IP 
One compelling reason for these outcomes is that, absent countervailing 
sovereignty concerns of sufficient import, the measure at issue can only be 
characterized as protectionist, culturally biased, or otherwise squarely running 
counter to the WTO’s ethos. The trade tribunals of the WTO, much like their 
counterparts in the European Union or other free trade areas and customs unions, 
will seek to level the competitive field by declaring measures based on cultural 
stereotypes that became enshrined in national preferences to be trade-
inconsistent.250 The removal of the disadvantageous competitive conditions will 
 
 244  Request for Consultations by the European Community, India–Measures Affecting the Importation 
and Sale of Wines and Spirits from the European Communities, WTO Doc. WT/DS352/1 (Nov. 23, 2006). 
 245 Request for Consultations by the European Communities, Canada–Tax Exemptions and Reductions for 
Wine and Beer, WTO Doc. WT/DS354/1 (Dec. 4, 2006). 
 246  Request for Consultations by the European Communities, India–Certain Taxes and Other Measures 
on Imported Wines and Spirits, WT/DS380/1 (Nov. 18, 2009). 
 247 Appellate Body Report, Philippines–Taxes on Distilled Spirits, WT/DS396/AB/R, WT/DS403/AB/R 
(Dec. 21, 2011). 
 248 Request for Consultations by Ukraine, Armenia–Measures Affecting the Importation and Internal Sale 
of Cigarettes and Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS411/1 (July 22, 2010). 
 249 Request for Consultations by Moldova, Ukraine–Taxes on Distilled Spirits, WT/DS423/1 (Mar. 7, 
2011). 
 250 See, e.g., Joshua Aizenmann & Eileen L. Brooks, Globalization and Taste Convergence: The Case of 
Wine and Beer, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11228, 2005) (finding a high degree of 
convergence of consumption of wine relative to beer within groups of countries that have a higher degree of 
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in turn enable foreign liquor to gradually gain access to domestic markets and 
transform national preferences.251  
Similarly, all liquor cases examined are also Investment Positive, creating a 
perfect correlation between investment and trade possible outcomes. All cases 
involved differential taxation on liquors, which could be contested by the model 
IT under several grounds. First, measures that were in violation with National 
Treatment provisions under trade law would also be in violation with National 
Treatment provisions in ITs.252 In addition, investors could argue that the 
measures carried out by the state constitute manifest injustice and arbitrary 
treatment. Finally, investors could also rely on the minimum standards of 
treatment provisions to argue they had a legitimate expectation that the host state 
would comply with its obligations under international law.  
C. Cigarettes and Related Products  
The outcomes of these cases are summarized in the table below: 
 
DS 227: Peru—Taxes on Cigarettes253 TP IPP 
DS 232: Mexico—Measures Affecting the Import of 
Matches254 
TP IP 
DS 302: Dominican Republic—Measures Affecting 






integration and that a “key prediction of international trade is confirmed in the data: greater trade integration 
weakens the association between production and consumption patterns”). 
 251 Id. 
 252 This is because, as has been noted ever since the early days of the WTO, in a typical liquor case, the 
challenged taxes are “offensive because the tax distinctions [a]re unsupported by any objective basis . . . no aim 
other than protectionism explain[s] the tax distinctions.” James H. Snelson, Can GATT Article III Recover from 
its Head-On Collision with United States – Taxes on Automobiles, 5 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 467, 472 n. 37 
(1996). As explained above, the absence of a colorable domestic purpose will doom a measure under both trade 
and investment laws.  
 253 Request for Consultations by Chile, Peru–Taxes on Cigarettes, WTO Doc. WT/DS227/1 (Mar. 6, 
2001) [hereinafter Peru—Taxes on Cigarettes]. 
 254 Request for Consultations by Chile, Mexico–Measures Affecting the Import of Matches, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS232/1 (May 28, 2001). 
 255 Request for Consultations by Honduras, Dominican Republic–Measures Affecting the Importation of 
Cigarettes, WTO Doc. WT/DS300/1 (Sept. 3, 2003); Appellate Body Report, Dominican Republic Measures 
Affecting the Importation and Internal Sale of Cigarettes, WTO Doc. WT/DS302/AB/R (Apr. 25, 2005) 
[hereinafter Dominican Republic—Importation and Internal Sale of Cigarettes]. 
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DS 371: Thailand—Customs and Fiscal Measures on 
Cigarettes from the Philippines256  
TP IP 
DS 406: United States—Measures Affecting the 
Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes257 
TP IPP 
DS 434; DS 435; DS 441 Australia—Plain 
Packaging258 
TN IN 
This category of cases borrows some of the features of the Liquor Cases and 
the Food Cases described below. Some of the Cigarette Cases reflect a 
straightforward desire to protect a profitable domestic cigarette industry, much 
like the domestic liquor industry tended to elicit protectionism from 
government.259 Other proceedings implicate legitimate health concerns, and yet, 
the science or the effectiveness of the measure taken by each State may be 
sufficiently contested to allow room for a strong argument that the measure 
should not outweigh the trade system’s interest in free movement of goods 
applying familiar principles of trade law. Peru, for example, blatantly tried to 
protect its own cigarettes by distinguishing between cigarettes based on the 
number of countries in which they are sold.260 The Peru case presented vastly 
different concerns than the plain packaging law proceedings where, after years 
of debate, Australia decided to adopt an extreme ban on attractive cigarette 
advertisements.261 Standing in the middle of these two poles, we find cases like 
the Clove Cigarette proceedings where the United States selectively targeted 
flavored cigarettes by banning clove cigarettes but not menthols.262 The Peru 
and United States cases fell in the Trade Positive side of the divides. I found 
sufficient evidence of protectionism, evaluated by the absence of a rational, 
 
 256 Appellate Body Report, Thailand–Customs and Fiscal Measures on Cigarettes from the Philippines, 
WTO Doc. WT/DS371/AB/R (June 17, 2011) [hereinafter Thailand—Cigarettes from the Phillipines]. 
 257 Panel Report, United States–Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, WTO 
Doc. WT/DS406/R (Sept. 2, 2011) [hereinafter United States–Clove Cigarettes]; Appellate Body Report, United 
States–Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, WTO Doc. WT/DS406/AB/R (Apr. 4, 
2017).  
 258 Australia—Trademarks and Other Plain Packaging Requirements, Request by Ukraine, supra note 217; 
Australia—Trademarks and Other Plain Packaging Requirements, Request by Honduras, supra note 217; 
Australia—Trademarks, Geographical Indications, and Other Plain Packaging Requirements, Request by 
Dominican Republic, supra note 217. 
 259 See, e.g., Dominican Republic–Importation and Internal Sale of Cigarettes, supra note 255; Thailand–
Cigarettes from the Philippines, supra note 256. 
 260 Peru—Taxes on Cigarettes, supra note 253. 
 261 Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011, supra note 214; Australia—Trademarks and Other Plain Packaging 
Requirements, supra note 217. 
 262 United States—Clove Cigarettes, supra note 257. 
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health-based justification for the measure at issue, to classify Peru in the 
Investment Positive side of the divide as well, and I classified the Cloves 
Cigarettes controversy as a Potentially Positive investment outcome because it 
involved a fair dose of unjustified discrimination between foreign and imported 
products, mixed with a legitimate health interests. 
Except for the Australia plain packaging case, discussed above, none of the 
cases examined are Investment Negative or Trade Negative.263 They all present 
a reasonable basis for investment arbitration claims and trade disputes, though 
to different extents. While some cases involved clear protectionist measures and 
were labeled both Investment Positive and Trade Positive,264 a couple cases 
involving cigarettes and related products present compelling health 
considerations and were therefore labeled as Investment Potentially Positive—
though they were all Trade Positive.265  
D. Food Cases 
I grouped all food-centered cases, including agricultural products such as 
bovine hides and soft drinks, in one category. Food Cases have abounded in the 
WTO,266 and the narrative of the filings shows a clear trend towards unjustified 
discrimination.267 The Food Cases read like a manual for protectionist measures. 
Countries have denied foreign products the right to use appellations commonly 
known by local consumers.268 Governments barred the import of food products 
 
 263 Australia—Trademarks and Other Plain Packaging Requirements, supra note 217; Australia—
Trademarks and Other Plain Packaging Requirements, supra note 217; Australia—Trademarks, Geographical 
Indications, and Other Plain Packaging Requirements, supra note 217. 
 264 See Peru—Taxes on Cigarettes, supra note 253; Mexico - Measures Affecting the Import of Matches, 
supra note 254; Thailand—Cigarettes from the Philippines, supra note 256. 
 265 See Dominican Republic—Importation and Internal Sale of Cigarettes, supra note 255; United States—
Clove Cigarettes, supra note 257; Australia—Trademarks and Other Plain Packaging Requirements, Request by 
Ukraine, supra note 217; Australia—Trademarks and Other Plain Packaging Requirements, Request by 
Honduras, supra note 217; Australia—Trademarks, Geographical Indications, and Other Plain Packaging 
Requirements, supra note 217. 
 266 Dispute Settlement – Index of Disputed Issues, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/English/ 
tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_subjects_index_e.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2018). 
 267 See, e.g., Request for Consultations by the United States, Australia—Measures Affecting the 
Importation of Salmonids, WTO Doc. WT/DS21/1 (Nov. 23, 1995) [hereinafter Australia—Measures Affecting 
the Importation of Salmonids]; Request for Consultations by the United States, Korea—Measures Concerning 
Inspection of Agricultural Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS41/1 (May 31, 1996) [hereinafter Korea—Measures 
Concerning Inspection of Agricultural Products]; Request for Consultations from Canada, United States—
Certain Measures Affecting the Import of Cattle, Swine and Grain from Canada, WTO Doc. WT/DS144/1 (Sept. 
29, 1998) [hereinafter United States—Certain Measures Affecting the Import of Cattle, Swine and Grain from 
Canada]. 
 268 See, e.g., Panel Report, European Communities—Trade Description of Scallops, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS7/R (Aug. 5, 1996) [hereinafter European Communities—Trade Description of Scallops]. 
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suspected of creating health risks even though the countries of export were 
disease-free.269 Ports have been shut down to foreign imports, and the 
governments artificially created inspection measures for the express purpose of 
slowing down the import of foreign goods.270 Alternatively creative or 
predictably protective in crafting measures, governments have worked hard at 
protecting their domestic food sectors.271 All of these clear cases are classified 
as both Investment Positive and Trade Positive. 
Some Food Cases will raise legitimate issues of health, consumer safety, or 
other domestic concerns. These cases could implicate not only obvious dangers 
like foot-and-mouth disease or mad cow disease, but also production techniques 
like those involving genetically modified organisms or hormones that may 
create risks for the consumer.272 In those instances, the science may not be 
definitive, and the trade tribunal will have to determine whether the measure at 
issue, assuming it has a sufficiently pronounced disparate impact on the foreign 
product, amounts to an unjustified denial of national treatment.273 If the measure 
applies neutrally and does not violate national treatment, the DSB will still have 
to analyze whether it violates the SPS because of an insufficient scientific basis 
for applying it.274 For those cases, where there is a genuine and substantial 
question as to health or other domestic purposes of the regulation at issue, or 
where a non-discrimination rationale applies on the trade side, I have determined 
the Investment outcome using the factors described above and seriously 
 
 269 See Request for Consultations by the European Communities, United States—Measures Affecting 
Imports of Poultry Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS100/1 (Aug. 25, 1997) [hereinafter United States—Measures 
Affecting Imports of Poultry Products]; Request for Consultations by Switzerland, Slovak Republic—Measures 
Concerning the Importation of Dairy Products and the Transit of Cattle, WTO Doc. WT/DS133/1 (May 18, 
1998) [hereinafter Slovak Republic—Measures Concerning the Importation of Dairy Products and the Transit 
of Cattle]. 
 270 See United States—Measures Affecting Imports of Poultry Products, supra note 269; Slovak 
Republic—Measures Concerning the Importation of Dairy Products and the Transit of Cattle, supra note 269. 
 271 Request for Consultations by Argentina, United States—Tariff Rate Quota for Imports of Groundnuts, 
WTO Doc. WT/DS111/1 (Jan. 8, 1998) [hereinafter United States—Tariff Rate Quota for Imports of 
Groundnuts]; Request for Consultations by the United States, Korea—Measures Concerning the Shelf-Life of 
Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS5/1 (May 5, 1995) [hereinafter Korea—Measures Concerning Bottled Water]; 
Request for Consultation by Canada, Korea—Measures Concerning Bottled Water, WTO Doc. WT/DS20/1 
(Nov. 22, 1995). 
 272 James Andrews, Imports and Exports: The Global Beef Trade, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (Nov. 18, 2013), 
http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2013/11/imports-and-exports-the-beef-trade/#.Wf0rWmiPI54; Donna Roberts 
& Laurian Unnevehr, Resolving Trade Disputes Arising from Trends in Food Safety Regulation: The Role of the 
Multilateral Governance Framework, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND FOOD SAFETY: ECONOMIC THEORIES AND 
CASE STUDIES 28, 29–30 (Jean C. Buzby ed., 2003). 
 273 Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 
493, art. 5, ¶ 7; Roberts & Unnevehr, supra note 272. 
 274 Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 
493, art. 5, ¶¶ 6, 8. 
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considered Investment Negative classification—and at the very least 
downgraded the case to a Potentially Positive, regardless of whether the WTO 
has or might have ruled in favor of the complainant. 
The outcomes of the Food Cases are summarized in the following table: 
 
DS 3: Korea—Measures Concerning the Testing and 





DS 5: Korea—Measures Concerning the Shelf-Life of 
Products276 
TP IP 
DS 7: European Communities—Trade Description of 
Scallops277 
TP IP 
DS 18: Australia—Measures Affecting Importation of 
Salmon278 
TP IP 
DS 20: Korea—Measures Concerning the Bottled Water279 TP IP 
DS 21: Australia—Measures Affecting the Importation of 
Salmonids280 
TP IP 
DS 26 & 48: European Communities—EC Measures 











DS 58: United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp 





DS 72: European Communities—Measures Affecting Butter 
Products284 
TP IP 
DS 74: Philippines—Measures Affecting Pork and Poultry285 TP IP 
 
 275 Request for Consultations by the United States, Korea—Measures Concerning the Testing and 
Inspection of Agricultural Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS3/1 (Apr. 4, 1995). 
 276  Korea—Measures Concerning the Shelf Life of Products, supra note 271. 
 277 European Communities—Trade Description of Scallops, supra note 268. 
 278 Appellate Body Report, Australia—Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS18/AB/R (adopted Oct. 20, 1998). 
 279 Korea—Measures Concerning Bottled Water, supra note 271. 
 280 Australia—Measures Affecting the Importation of Salmonids, supra note 267. 
 281 Appellate Body Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WTO Doc. 
WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (adopted Jan. 16, 1998). 
 282 Korea—Measures Concerning Inspection of Agricultural Products, supra note 267. 
 283 Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 
WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R (adopted Oct. 12, 1998). 
 284 Panel Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Butter Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS72/R 
(adopted Nov. 24, 1999). 
 285 Request for Consultations by the United States, Philippines—Measures Affecting Pork and Poultry, 
WTO Doc. WT/DS74/1 (Apr. 7, 1997). 
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DS 76: Japan—Measures Affecting Agricultural Products286 TP IPP 
DS 100: United States—Measures Affecting Imports of 
Poultry Products287 
TP IPP 
DS 102: Philippines—Measures Affecting Pork and Poultry288 TP IP 
DS 105: European Communities—Regime for the Importation, 





DS 107: Pakistan—Export Measures Affecting Hides and 
Skins290 
TP IP 
DS 111: United States—Tariff Rate Quota for Imports of 
Groundnuts291 
TP IP 
DS 120: India—Measures Affecting Export of Certain 
Commodities292 
TP IP 
DS 133: Slovak Republic—Measures Concerning the 





DS 134: European Communities—Restrictions on Certain 
Import Duties on Rice294 
TP IP 
DS 143: Slovak Republic—Measure Affecting Import Duty on 





DS 144: United States—Certain Measures Affecting the 





DS 148: Czech Republic—Measure Affecting Import Duty on 






 286 Appellate Body Report, Japan—Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS76/AB/R (adopted Feb. 22, 1999). 
 287 United States—Measures Affecting Imports of Poultry Products, supra note 269. 
 288 Request for Consultation by United States, Philippines—Measures Affecting Pork and Poultry, WTO 
Doc. WT/DS102/1 (Oct. 9, 1997). 
 289 Request for Consultation by Panama, European Communities—Regime for the Importation, Sale and 
Distribution of Bananas, WTO Doc. WT/DS105/1 (Oct. 29, 1997). 
 290 Request for Consultations by the European Communities, Pakistan—Export Measures Affecting Hides 
and Skins, WTO Doc. WT/DS107/1 (Nov. 20, 1997). 
 291 United States—Tariff Rate Quota for Imports of Groundnuts, supra note 271.  
 292 Request for Consultations from the European Communities, India—Measures Affecting Export of 
Certain Commodities, WTO Doc. WT/DS120/1 (Mar. 23, 1998). 
 293 Slovak Republic—Measures Concerning the Importation of Dairy Products and Transit of Cattle, supra 
note 269. 
 294 Request for Consultations by India, European Communities—Restrictions on Certain Import Duties on 
Rice, WTO Doc. WT/DS134/1 (June 8, 1998). 
 295 Request for Consultations from Hungary, Slovak Republic—Measure Affecting Import Duty on Wheat 
from Hungary, WTO Doc. WT/DS143/1 (Sept. 21, 1998). 
 296 United States—Certain Measures Affecting the Import of Cattle, Swine and Grain from Canada, supra 
note 267. 
 297 Request for Consultations from Hungary, Czech Republic—Measure Affecting Import Duty on Wheat 
from Hungary, WTO Doc. WT/DS148/1 (Oct. 15, 1998). 
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DS 154: European Communities—Measures Affecting 
Differential and Favourable Treatment of Coffee298 
TP IPP 
DS 155: Argentina—Measures Affecting the Export of Bovine 





DS 161 & 169: Korea—Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, 





DS 193: Chile—Measures Affecting the Transit and 
Importation of Swordfish301 
TP IP 
DS 205: Egypt—Import Prohibition on Canned Tuna with 
Soybean Oil302 
TP IPP 
DS 209: European Communities—Measures Affecting Soluble 
Coffee303 
TP IP 
DS 231: European Communities—Trade Description of 
Sardines304 
TP IP 
DS 237: Turkey—Certain Import Procedures for Fresh Fruit305 TP IP 
DS 240: Romania—Import Prohibition on Wheat and Wheat 
Flour306 
TP IP 
DS 245: Japan—Measures Affecting the Importation of 
Apples307 
TP IPP 
DS 250: United States—Equalizing Excise Tax Imposed by 
Florida on Processed Orange and Grapefruit Products308 
TP IP 
 
 298 Request for Consultations by Brazil, European Communities—Measures Affecting Differential and 
Favourable Treatment of Coffee, WTO Doc. WT/DS154/1 (Dec. 11, 1998). 
 299 Panel Report, Argentina—Measures Affecting the Export of Bovine Hides and the Import of Finished 
Leather, WTO Doc. WT/DS155/R (adopted December 19, 2000) [hereinafter 2000 Argentina-Bovine Hides and 
Finished Leather Panel Report]. 
 300 Appellate Body Report, Korea—Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, WTO 
Doc. WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R (adopted Dec. 11, 2000). 
 301 Request for Consultations by the European Communities, Chile—Measures Affecting the Transit and 
Importation of Swordfish, WTO Doc. WT/DS193/4 (June 3, 2010). 
 302 Request for Consultations by Thailand, Egypt—Import Prohibition on Canned Tuna with Soybean Oil, 
WTO Doc. WT/DS205/1 (Sept. 27, 2000). 
 303 Request for Consultations by Brazil, European Communities—Measures Affecting Soluble Coffee, 
WTO Doc. WT/DS209/1 (Oct. 19, 2000). 
 304 Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Trade Description of Sardines, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS231/AB/R (adopted Sept. 26, 2002). 
 305 Request for Consultations by Ecuador, Turkey—Certain Import Procedures for Fresh Fruit, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS237/1 (Sept. 10, 2001). 
 306 Request for Consultations by Hungary, Romania—Import Prohibition on Wheat and Wheat Flour, 
WTO Doc. WT/DS240/1 (Nov. 17, 2001).  
 307 Appellate Body Report, Japan—Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS245/AB/R (adopted Nov. 26, 2003). 
 308 Request for Consultations by Brazil, United States—Equalizing Excise Tax Imposed by Florida on 
Processed Orange and Grapefruit Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS250/1 (Mar. 26, 2002).  
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DS 255: Peru—Tax Treatment on Certain Imported 
Products309 
TP IP 
DS 256: Turkey—Import Ban on Pet Food from Hungary310 TP IPP 
DS 270 & 271: Australia—Certain Measures Affecting the 











DS 276: Canada—Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and 
Treatment of Imported Grain313 
TP IP 
DS 279: India—Import Restrictions Maintained Under the 





DS 284: Mexico—Certain Measures Preventing the Importation 
of Black Beans from Nicaragua 315 
TP IP 
DS 287: Australia—Quarantine Regime for Imports316 TP IPP 
DS 297: Croatia—Measure Affecting Imports of Live Animals 
and Meat Products317 
TP IPP 
DS 308: Mexico—Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other 
Beverages318 
TP IP 




 309 Request for Consultations by Chile, Peru—Tax Treatment on Certain Imported Products, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS255/1 (Apr. 29, 2002). 
 310 Request for Consultations by Hungary, Turkey—Import Ban on Pet Food from Hungary, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS256/1 (May 7, 2002). 
 311 Request for Consultations by the Philippines, Australia—Certain Measures Affecting the Importation 
of Fresh Fruit and Vegetables, WTO Doc. WT/DS270/1 (Oct. 23, 2002); Request for Consultations by the 
Philippines, Australia—Certain Measures Affecting the Importation of Fresh Pineapple, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS271/1 (Oct. 23, 2002).  
 312 Request for Consultations by the United States, Venezuela—Import Licensing Measures on Certain 
Agricultural Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS4275/1 (Nov. 12, 2002).  
 313 Appellate Body Report, Canada—Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment of Imported 
Grain, WTO Doc. WT/DS276/AB/R (adopted Aug. 30, 2004).  
 314 Request for Consultations by the European Communities, India—Import Restrictions Maintained 
Under the Export and Import Policy 2002–2007, WTO Doc. WT/279/1 (Jan. 9, 2003). 
 315 Request for Consultations by Nicaragua, Mexico—Certain Measures Preventing the Importation of 
Black Beans from Nicaragua, WTO Doc. WT/DS284/1 (Mar. 20, 2003). 
 316 Request for Consultations by the European Communities, Australia—Quarantine Regime for Imports, 
WTO Doc. WT/DS287/1 (Apr. 9, 2003). 
 317 Request for Consultations by Hungary, Croatia—Measure Affecting Imports of Live Animals and Meat 
Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS297/1 (July 14, 2003). 
 318 Appellate Body Report, Mexico—Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, supra note 156. 
 319 Panel Report, Turkey—Measures Affecting the Importation of Rice, WTO Doc. WT/DS334/R (adopted 
Sept. 21, 2007). 
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DS 367: Australia—Measures Affecting the Importation of 





DS 369: European Communities—Certain Measures 





DS 381: United States—Measures Concerning the 
Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products 





DS 384 & 386: United States—Certain Country of Origin 





DS 389: European Communities—Certain Measures Affecting 






DS 391: Korea—Measures Affecting the Importation of 





DS 392: United States—Certain Measures Affecting 





DS 400 & 401: European Communities—Measures 





DS 430: India—Measures Concerning the Importation of 





DS 447: United States—Measures Affecting the Importation 







 320 Appellate Body Report, Australia—Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples from New Zealand, 
WTO Doc. WT/DS367/AB/R (adopted Nov. 29, 2010). 
 321 Request for Consultations by Canada, European Communities—Certain Measures Prohibiting the 
Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS369/1 (Oct. 1, 2007). 
 322 Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of 
Tuna and Tuna Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS381/AB/R (adopted May 16, 2012). 
 323 Appellate Body Reports, United States—Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL) Requirements, 
WTO Doc. WT/DS384/AB/R, WT/DS386/AB/R (adopted June 29,2012). 
 324 Request for Consultations by the United States, European Communities—Certain Measures Affecting 
Poultry Meat and Poultry Meat Products from the United States, WTO Doc. WT/DS389/1 (Jan. 20, 2009). 
 325 Panel Report, Korea—Measures Affecting the Importation of Bovine Meat and Meat Products from 
Canada, WTO Doc. WT/DS391/R (adopted July 3, 2012). 
 326 Panel Report, United States—Certain Measures Affecting Imports of Poultry from China, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS392/R (adopted Sept. 29, 2010). 
 327 Appellate Body Reports, European Communities—Measures Prohibiting the Importation and 
Marketing of Seal Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS400/AB/R, WT/DS401/AB/R (adopted May 22, 2014). 
 328 Appellate Body Report, India—Measures Concerning the Importation of Certain Agricultural 
Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS430/AB/R (adopted June 4, 2015). 
 329 Panel Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Importation of Animals, Meat and Other Animal 
Products from Argentina, WTO Doc. WT/DS447/R (adopted July 24, 2015). 
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DS 448: United States—Measures Affecting the Importation of 
Fresh Lemons330 
TP IP 
DS 455: Indonesia—Importation of Horticultural Products, 





E. Automobile and Gasoline Cases 
I grouped all cases involving the automobile industry into one category. I 
also included the cases “Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline” and 
“Retreaded Tyres” because of their connection to the car industry.332 All of these 
cases fall in the Trade Positive—Investment Positive category with the 
exception of the “Retreaded Tyres” and the “Reformulated and Conventional 
Gasoline” cases.333 This outcome is not surprising given the traditional 
incentives to protect the automobile industry. This industry has had a relatively 
high rate of unionization in industrialized countries.334 The industry has 
created numerous skilled and semi-skilled jobs, and the outsourcing of 
component parts or assembly is common.335 Component parts may be subject 
to a separate duty, thereby creating gaming opportunities.336  
At the same time, the industry involves obvious environmental and resource 
conservation concerns.337 Cars may be more eco-friendly if built with gasoline 
 
 330 Request for Consultations by Argentina, United States—Measures Affecting the Importation of Fresh 
Lemons, WTO Doc. WT/DS448/1 (Sept. 5, 2012). 
 331 Request for Consultations by the United States, Indonesia—Importation of Horticultural Products, 
Animals and Animal products, WTO Doc. WT/DS455/1 (Jan. 14, 2013). 
 332 Appellate Body Report, Brazil—Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS332/AB/R (adopted Dec. 3, 2007) [hereinafter Retreaded Tyres]; Appellate Body Report, United 
States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WTO Doc. WT/DS2/AB/R (adopted Apr. 29, 
1996) [hereinafter Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline]. 
 333 Retreaded Tyres, supra note 332; Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, supra note 332. 
 334 See William Serrin, Shrinking U.A.W. Tries to Steer a Steady Course Through Troubled Time, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 22, 1982), http://www.nytimes.com/1982/06/22/us/shrinking-uaw-tries-to-steer-a-steady-course-
through-troubled-times.html. 
 335 JOEL CUTCHER-GERSHENFELD ET AL., THE DECLINE AND RESURGENCE OF THE U.S. AUTO INDUSTRY 
20 (Econ. Pol’y Inst. 2015); Rick Haglund, Auto Future: A Bounty of Jobs and Opportunity for Skilled Workers, 
THE BRIDGE (July 24, 2013), http://www.bridgemi.com/economy/auto-future-bounty-jobs-and-opportunity-
skilled-workers. 
 336 JEFFREY WILLIAMS ET AL., 2016 TOP MARKETS REPORT: AUTOMOTIVE PARTS 34 (Int’l Trade Admin. 
2016). 
 337 John Mikler, The International Car Industry And Environmental Sustainability: Moving Beyond 
Green-Washing?, SUSTAINABILITY AND SOCIAL SCIENCE ROUND TABLE 125–27 (CSIRO 2004). The car 
industry is a major contributor to pollution on a worldwide basis and a prime candidate for regulatory 
intervention to internalize externalities. Id.; see also J. Sutherland et al., A Global Perspective on the 
Environmental Challenges Facing the Automotive Industry: State-Of-The-Art and Directions for the Future, 35 
INT’L J. VEHICLE DESIGN 86 (2004). 
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consumption and other environmentally relevant considerations in mind, or they 
may be built more “ego-friendly” and may be subjected to stricter regulation or 
higher levels of taxation, like luxury cars with a high rate of gasoline 
consumption. This variation might create an incentive for governments to 
regulate in the name of environmental or resource conservation concerns, which 
could either amount to a disguised restriction or be insufficiently strong to justify 
the restriction on trade. The Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline case 
exemplifies this possibility, but I downgraded it to Potentially Positive on the 
investment side because of the domestic sensitivities associated with the 
resource conservation aspects of the measure discussed below.  
The outcomes of these cases are set forth in the table below: 
 






DS 54, 55, 59 & 64: Indonesia—Certain Measures 

















DS 195: Philippines—Measures Affecting Trade and 












 338 Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, supra note 332. 
 339 Panel Reports, Indonesia—Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R, WT/DS64/R (adopted July 2, 1998) [hereinafter 1998 Indonesia-
Automobile Industry Panel Report]. 
 340 Appellate Body Report, Canada—Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS139/AB/R, WT/DS142/AB/R (adopted May 31, 2000). 
 341 Appellate Body Report, India—Measures Affecting the Automotive Sector, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS146/AB/R, WT/DS175/AB/R (adopted Mar. 19, 2002). 
 342 Request for Consultations by the United States, Philippines—Measures Affecting Trade and Investment 
in the Motor Vehicle Sector, WTO Doc. WT/DS195/1 (May 31, 2000). 
 343 Retreaded Tyres, supra note 332. 
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DS 339, 340 & 342: China—Measures Affecting Imports of 
Automobile Parts344 
TP IP 
F. General Market Access 
In this category, I grouped cases involving familiar forms of protectionism, 
such as minimum import pricing, as well as cases that did not readily fit into an 
industry-specific grouping. The vast majority of the cases are both Trade 
Positive and Investment Positive. This should come as no surprise because 
general market access restrictions are the key aspects of protectionism. In fact, 
this category includes only one Trade Negative case: Japan—Measures 
Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper.345 This case reflected a deep 
trade tension between Japan—whose economy had been export-oriented since 
after World War II—and the U.S., which sought to gain greater access to the 
Japanese market after its remarkable solidification.346 The U.S. claimed Japan 
was taking protective measures to defend Fuji, its local photographic film and 
paper manufacturer.347 The Panel found that none of the Japanese measures were 
improper.348 However, an arbitrator may cut through the traditionally protective 
market access structure of Japan and rule in favor of a complainant similarly 
situated to Kodak, the American photographic film manufacturer. I have, 
therefore, classified this case as an Investment Potentially Positive filing.  
  
 
 344 Appellate Body Reports, China—Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS339/AB/R, WT/DS340/AB/R, WT/DS342/AB/R (adopted Dec. 15, 2008). 
 345 Panel Report, Japan—Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS44/R (adopted Mar. 31, 1998) [hereinafter Photographic Film and Paper]. 
 346 Id.; Wenyu Zang & Mark Baimbridge, Exports, Imports and Economic Growth in South Korea and 
Japan: A Tale of Two Economies, 44 APPLIED ECON. 361, 362 (2012); Patrick Christy, America’s Proud History 
of Post-War Aid, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (June 6, 2014), https://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-
report/2014/06/06/the-lessons-from-us-aid-after-world-war-ii. 
 347 Photographic Film and Paper, supra note 345. 
 348 Id. 
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DS 44: Japan—Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic 





DS 431, 432 & 433 China—Measures Related to the 





DS 116: Brazil—Measures Affecting Payment Terms for 
Imports351 
TP IP 
DS 137: European Communities—Measures Affecting 





DS 149: India—Import Restrictions353 TP IP 
DS 188: Nicaragua—Measures Affecting Imports from 





DS 197: Brazil—Measures on Minimum Import Prices355 TP IP 
DS 198: Romania—Measures on Minimum Import 
Prices356 
TP IP 
DS 201: Nicaragua—Measures Affecting Imports from 











DS 246: European Communities—Tariff Preferences359 TP IP 
DS 358 & 359: China—Measures Concerning Refunds, 







 349 Id. 
 350 Appellate Body Reports, China—Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten and 
Molybdenum, WTO Doc. WT/DS431/AB/R, WT/DS432/AB/R, WT/DS433/AB/R (adopted Aug. 7, 2014). 
 351 Request for Consultations by the European Communities, Brazil—Measures Affecting Payment Terms 
for Imports, WTO Doc. WT/DS116/1 (Jan. 13, 1998). 
 352 Request for Consultations by Canada, European Communities—Measures Affecting Imports of Wood 
of Conifers from Canada, WTO Doc. WT/DS137/1 (June 24, 1998).  
 353 Request for Consultations by the European Communities, India—Import Restrictions, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS149/1 (Nov. 12, 1998). 
 354 Request for Consultations by Colombia, Nicaragua—Measures Affecting Imports from Honduras and 
Colombia, WTO Doc. WT/DS188/1 (Jan. 20, 2000).  
 355 Request for Consultations by the United States, Brazil—Measures on Minimum Import Prices, WTO 
Doc. WT/DS197/1 (June 7, 2000).  
 356 Request for Consultations by the United States, Romania—Measures on Minimum Import Prices, WTO 
Doc. WT/DS198/1 (June 8, 2000). 
 357 Request for Consultations by Honduras, Nicaragua—Measures Affecting Imports from Honduras and 
Colombia, WTO Doc. WT/DS201/1 (June 13, 2000). 
 358 Request for Consultations by India, Argentina—Measures Affecting the Import of Pharmaceutical 
Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS233/1 (May 30, 2001).  
 359 Report of the Appellate Body, European Communities—Conditions for the Granting of Tariff 
Preferences to Developing Countries, WTO Doc. WT/DS246/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2004). 
 360 Request for Consultations by the United States, China—Certain Measures Granting Refunds, 
Reductions or Exemptions from Taxes and Other Payments, WTO Doc. WT/DS358/1 (Feb. 7, 2007). 
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DS 421: Moldova—Measures Affecting the Importation 





DS 438, 444, 445 & 446: Argentina—Measures Affecting 






I grouped under this heading all textiles cases raising a substantial Article III 
or Article XI concern. The cases discussed here reflect domestic efforts to 
protect growing textiles industries or, in some cases, to resist the textile 
production outsourcing to more cost-effective jurisdictions that have 
characterized the industry. Not surprisingly, these cases are all Trade Positive—
Investment Positive filings. 
The outcomes of these cases are summarized in the table below: 
 
DS 29, 34 & 47: Turkey—Restriction on the Import of 





DS 90, 91, 92, 93, 94 & 96: India—Quantitative Restrictions 






 361 Request for Consultations by Ukraine, Moldova—Measures Affecting the Importation and Internal 
Sale of Goods (Environmental Charge), WTO Doc. WT/DS421/1 (Feb. 21, 2011).  
 362 Appellate Body Report, Argentina—Measures Affecting the Importation of Goods, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS438/AB/R, WT/DS444/AB/R, WT/DS445/AB/R (adopted Jan. 1, 2015); Request for Consultations by 
Mexico, Argentina – Measures Affecting the Importation of Goods, WTO Doc. WT/DS446/1 (Aug. 29, 2012).  
 363 Appellate Body Report, Turkey—Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS34/AB/R (adopted Oct. 22, 1999); Request for Consultations by Thailand, Turkey—Restrictions on 
Imports of Textile and Clothing Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS47/1 (June 26, 1996); Communication from the 
European Communities, Turkey—Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS29/2 (Mar. 1, 1996). 
 364 Appellate Body Report, India—Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, Textile and 
Industrial Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS90/AB/R (adopted Aug. 23, 1999); Request for Consultations by the 
European Communities, India—Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, Textile and Industrial 
Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS96/1 (July 24, 1997); Request for Consultations by Switzerland, India—
Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS94/1 
(July 23, 1997); Appellate Body Report, India—Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, Textile 
and Industrial Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS91/AB/R (adopted July 22, 1997); Request for Consultations by 
Canada, India—Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products, WTO 
Doc. WT/DS92/1 (July 22, 1997); Request for Consultations by New Zealand, India—Quantitative Restrictions 
on Imports of Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS93/1 (July 22, 1997). 
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DS 151: United States—Measures Affecting Textiles and 





DS 196: Argentina—Measures Affecting the Import of 
Pharmaceutical Products, Request for Consultation366 
TP IP 
DS 183: Brazil—Measures on Import Licensing and Minimum 
Import Prices367 
TP IP 
DS 451: China—Measures Related to the Production and 





DS 366: Colombia—Ports of Entry—Panama Colón Free 
Zone369 
TP IP 
H. Intellectual Property 
I grouped under this heading the cases involving national treatment, Article 
XI of the GATT, SPS, or TBT claims related to intellectual property protection 
of foreign products.370 Excluding cases involving public health 
considerations,371 I classified these cases as Trade Positive—Investment 
Positive. 




 365 Request for Consultations by the European Communities, United States—Measures Affecting Textiles 
and Apparel Products (II), WTO Doc. WT/DS151/1 (Nov. 25, 1998). 
 366 Request for Consultations by India, Argentina—Measures Affecting the Import of Pharmaceutical 
Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS233/1 (May 30, 2001).  
 367 Request for Consultations by the European Communities, Brazil—Measures on Import Licensing and 
Minimum Import Prices, WTO Doc. WT/DS183/1 (Oct. 25, 1999).  
 368 Request for Consultations by Mexico, China—Measures Relating to the Production and Exportation 
of Apparel and Textile Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS451/1 (Oct. 18, 2012). 
 369 Panel Report, Colombia—Indicative Prices and Restrictions on Port of Entry, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS366/R (adopted Apr. 27, 2009) [hereinafter 2009 Colombia—Indicative Prices and Restrictions Panel 
Report]. 
 370 I have not included the “pure” TRIPS cases (i.e., those that arise only in connection with a claimed 
failure to adhere to a State’s intellectual property obligations but do not implicate the trade provisions discussed 
in this Article). I will address those cases in the sequel to this Article. Also, I have classified the plain packaging 
case as a Cigarettes and Related Products Case even though it could just as easily qualify as an Intellectual 
Property Case. 
 371 See infra notes 367, 369. 
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DS 174: European Communities—Protection of Trademarks 






DS 199: Brazil—Measures Affecting Patent Protection373 TP IPP 
DS 224: United States—US Patents Code374 TP IP 
DS 434, 435 & 441: Australia—Certain Measures Concerning 
Trademarks, Geographical Indications and Other Plain 





DS 290: European Communities—Protection of Trademarks 






DS 186: United States—Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 





I. Periodicals, Films, and Other Cultural Products 
I loosely labeled and categorized these cases as “Cultural Cases.” I have, as 
an operational rule, assumed that my IT will be interpreted with special 
deference to cultural industries. Therefore, any case in this section that would 
otherwise be Investment Positive has been downgraded to Potentially Positive. 
 
 372 Panel Report, Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products and 
Foodstuffs—Complaint by the United States, WTO Doc. WT/DS174/R (adopted Mar. 15, 2005) [hereinafter 
European Communities—Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications]. 
 373 Request for Consultations by the United States, Brazil—Measures Affecting Patent Protection, WTO 
Doc. WT/DS199/1 (June 8, 2000). 
 374 Request for Consultations by Brazil, United States—US Patents Code, WTO Doc. WT/DS224/1 (July 
2, 2001).  
 375 Communication from the Panel, Australia—Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks and Other 
Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and Packaging, WTO Doc. WT/DS434/15 (Oct. 
27, 2014); Communication from the Panel, Australia—Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks, 
Geographical Indications and Other Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and 
Packaging, WTO Doc. WT/DS441/19 (Oct. 22 2014); Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Honduras, 
Australia—Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks, Geographical Indications and Other Plain Packaging 
Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and Packaging, WTO Doc. WT/DS435/16 (Oct. 17, 2012). 
 376 Panel Report, European Communities—Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications for 
Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs—Complaint by Australia, WTO Doc. WT/DS290/R, (adopted Mar. 15, 
2005) [hereinafter 2005 Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products and 
Foodstuffs]. 
 377 Request for Consultations by the European Communities and their member States, United States—
Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 and Amendments Thereto, WTO Doc. WT/DS186/1 (Jan. 18, 2000).  
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DS 31: Canada—Measures Concerning Periodicals378 TP IPP 
DS 43: Turkey—Taxation of Foreign Film Revenues379 TP IPP 
DS 363: China—Measures Affecting Trading Rights and 
Distribution Services for Certain Publications and 






This category includes a single case: a filing challenging the United States’ 
secondary embargo targeting companies engaged in certain commercial 
activities with Cuba: 
DS 38: United States—The Cuban Democracy and Solidarity Act.381 
The case is interesting because, in an era where international strategic 
considerations include a strong emphasis on economic sanctions (as the Iran 
nuclear issue demonstrates) and when allies do not necessarily agree completely 
on tactics, the issues that it presents may well recur. This case qualifies as a 
Trade Positive and an Investment Potentially Positive filing because the United 
States’ measure will likely violate Article XI as it potentially breaches principles 
of customary international law.382 The WTO may find a ban on imports not 
justified by any valid domestic purpose. An arbitral tribunal may lend a 
sympathetic ear and award damages for sales lost as a result of the secondary 
embargo and other causally related damages. However, the national security 
justification for the measure may deter the tribunal from intervening; for this 
reason, this case is an Investment Potentially Positive. 
 
 378 Appellate Body Report, Canada—Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS31/AB/R (adopted June 30, 1997). 
 379 Request for Consultations by the United States, Turkey—Taxation of Foreign Film Revenues, WTO 
Doc. WT/DS435/1 (June 17, 1996). 
 380 Appellate Body Report, China—Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for 
Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS363/AB/R (adopted Dec. 21, 
2009). 
 381 Request for Consultations by the European Communities, United States—The Cuban Liberty and 
Democratic Solidarity Act, WTO Doc. WT/DS38/1 (Mar. 13, 1996). 
 382 Request for Consultations by the European Communities, United States—The Cuban Liberty and 
Democratic Solidarity Act, WTO Doc. WT/DS38/1 (May 13, 1996); General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 
art. XI, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194. 
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K. Asbestos 
I included the famed Asbestos case in this category. The Appellate Body in 
this case dismissed the NT claim,383 and an investment tribunal would have 
probably reached the same conclusion. It is therefore a Trade Negative and 
Investment Negative case.384 
L. Technology Products 
I included cases involving high-tech products in this category. They raise 
issues of competition and market access similar to those discussed in both the 
General Market Access and the Commodities, Energy, and Raw Materials 
categories. As in the General Market Access, one case was classified as 
Investment Potentially Positive because of the possible public health concerns, 
while the other two are both Trade Positive—Investment Positive: 
 






DS 291, 292 & 293: European Communities—Measures 






DS 309: China—Value–Added Tax on Integrated 
Circuits387 
TP IP 
M. Commodities, Energy, and Raw Materials 
The history of trade and the WTO mirrors that of the trading nations’ 
economies and their interactions.388 One of the stories told by the cases in this 
subject matter category is that of the expansion of manufacturing to China, India, 
and other new economic powerhouses, the relationship of interdependence 
between these states and the traditional players in global trade, and the live 
 
 383 Request for Consultations by Canada, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and 
Products Containing Asbestos, WTO Doc. WT/DS135/1 (June 3, 1998). 
 384 Id. 
 385 Request for Consultations by the European Communities, Japan—Measures Affecting the Purchase of 
Telecommunications Equipment, WTO Doc. WT/DS15/1 (Aug. 24, 1995). 
 386 Panel Reports, European Communities—Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech 
Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R (adopted Sept. 29, 2006) [hereinafter 2006 
European Communities—Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products]. 
 387 Request for Consultations by the United States, China—Value-Added Tax on Integrated Circuits, 
WT/DS309/1 (Mar. 23, 2004). 
 388 Request for Consultations by the European Communities, Japan—Measures Affecting the Purchase of 
Telecommunications Equipment, WTO Doc. WT/DS15/1 (Aug. 24, 1995). 
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application of rational choice theory. Take, for example, the rare earths case 
pitting China against Western states,389 discussed in the General Market Access 
section above. Rare earths are necessary to a wide array of key products.390 
China’s restriction of raw material exports has the obvious effect of forcing 
foreign manufacturers to set up shop in China to have access to such raw 
materials. At the same time, as they seek to limit their losses to China’s 
manufacturing strength and to penetrate its thickly protected markets, the United 
States and European nations are engaged in violations of their own—and are 
being taken to task by China.391 Their consumer-hungry societies are also being 
fed by China-bought credit and their currencies by China-held debt.392 The 
constant theme, as demonstrated by the review of hundreds of WTO cases in this 
Article, is that the WTO will seek to root out protectionism. Based on my 
understanding of the history of trade and the constant drives that propel it 
forward, I have not hesitated to classify cases in these areas that involve 
protectionism or other unjustified measures as Trade Positives. The absence of 
domestic countervailing purposes has, by and large, prompted me to predict 
Investment Positive outcomes:393 
 






DS 387, 388, 390, 394, 395 & 398: China—Measures Related 






 389 Appellate Body Reports, China—Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten and 
Molybdenum, WTO Doc. WT/DS531/AB/R, WT/DS432/AB/R, WT/DS433/AB/R (adopted Aug. 7, 2014). 
 390 U.S.G.S., THE RARE-EARTH ELEMENTS – VITAL TO MODERN TECHNOLOGIES AND LIFESTYLES (Nov. 
2014). 
 391 See, e.g., Int’l Ctr. for Trade & Sustainable Dev., China Launches Solar Case Against E.U. at WTO, 
16 BRIDGES WEEKLY 4, 5 (2012) (describing “tit for tat” nature of China’s filing against E.U.). See generally 
Matthew C. Turk, Why Does the Complainant Always Win at the WTO?: A Reputation-Based Theory of 
Litigation at the Word Trade Organization, 31 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 385 (2011) (applying rational choice 
theory to explain states’ selection of largely meritorious cases advancing national interests). 
 392 Yu Yongding, Overcome the Fear of RMB Appreciation, in CHINA AND THE WORLD: BALANCE AND 
IMBALANCE 217–34 (Binhong SHAO, ed., Leiden 2013). China has accumulated $350 billion worth of foreign 
exchange reserves and lent that amount to the United States. Id. 
 393 See infra, notes 394–99. One case was downgraded to Investment Potentially Positive—DS 456: 
India—Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules. See infra, note 399. This case is a Trade 
Positive and Investment Potentially Positive because it raises claims of performance requirements, which may 
or may not be exempted from a BIT under procurement exemptions. 
 394 Request for Consultations under Article XXIII.1 of the GATT 1994 by Singapore, Malaysia—
Prohibition of Imports of Polyethylene and Polypropylene, WTO Doc. WT/DS1/1 (Jan. 13, 1995). 
 395 Request for Consultations by the United States, China—Measures Related to the Exportation of 
Various Raw Materials, WTO Doc. WT/DS394/1 (June 25, 2009). 
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DS 431, 432 & 433: China—Export, Quotas, Duties and 


















My review of WTO filings gave me a new flavor of the historical evolution 
of trade. I was struck by how many cases came down as Trade Positive without 
much of an analytical controversy. This was perhaps my biggest surprise on the 
trade side. I expected to find a strong trade-investment correlation, but not that 
it would translate into a wholesale capture of trade filings on account of an 
overwhelming number of Trade Positive cases. I obtain the same results in the 
sequel to this piece, including as they relate to anti-dumping and other measures 
that I have not reviewed here but that have a profound impact on trade law. My 
findings illustrate that it is meaningless to attempt to define a boundary 
distinguishing between goods and investments. A baker sells bread through a 
bakery. Any regulation affecting the bread will obviously impact the baker and 
the bakery. The implications of these findings will be examined in a separate 
paper. For now, it is sufficient to emphasize that states cannot simply assume 
that their obligations to the self-contained system of the WTO end there. The 
constantly emerging role of investment arbitrations against states requires them 
to calculate their steps more carefully than in the past. Conversely, investment 
lawyers should also be aware of the attack on trade. While the WTO’s self-
contained system may have legitimacy because of its limits, the investment 
system may lose its legitimacy if it achieves outcomes that may exceed the 
legitimate reach of international economic law in relation to sovereign 
regulatory space, as it is currently at risk of doing.  
 
 
 396 Appellate Body Report, Canada—Measures Relating to the Feed-In Tariff Program, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS426/AB/R (adopted May 6, 2013). 
 397 Appellate Body Reports, China—Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten, and 
Molybdenum, WTO Doc. WT/DS431/AB/R, WT/DS432/AB/R, WT/DS433/AB/R (adopted Aug. 7, 2014). 
 398 Request for Consultations by China, European Union and Certain Member States—Certain Measures 
Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector, WTO Doc. WT/DS452/1 (Nov. 7, 2012). 
 399 Appellate Body Report, India—Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules, WTO 
Doc. WT/DS456/AB/R (adopted Sept. 16, 2016). 
